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Abstract
Estimations suggest that one person in the United States tries to take their own life
every 38 seconds (Yeager & Roberts, 2015, p. 38), making suicide the 10th leading cause
of death in the nation (AFSP, 2016). Despite the prevalence of this issue, communication
surrounding suicidality remains scarce—as do concrete understandings of what causes
the desire to die in the first place. Dominant understandings link suicidality to
chemical/neurobiological issues in the brain (mental illnesses), but these claims have not
yet been scientifically proven (Hjelmeland, Dieserud, Dyregrov, Knizek, & Leenaars,
2012) and, as this study suggests, biomedical aspects of suicide are only part of a much
larger picture. In critically analyzing firsthand narratives of suicidality as they are shared
by attempt survivors, this work blends crip theory frameworks with narrative methods to
better understand how people experience suicidality, what brings them to attempt, and
how treatment for survivors could be improved. Within these narratives, survivors make
sense of their suicidality in hybrid forms by utilizing biomedical frameworks while also
describing social causes for their attempts, notably including the ableist Othering of
people deemed “mentally ill.” Through this analysis, what results is a fuller
understanding of how people make sense of suicidal inclinations from an insiderperspective, as well as a set of “crip” critiques that implicate psychiatric hospitals and
other biomedical care facilities as sites of oppression and abuse.
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Chapter One — Understanding Suicide: Medical Malady or Social Transgression?
Although no official count of suicide attempts is kept in the United States,
estimations suggest that one person in this country tries to take their own life every 38
seconds (Yeager & Roberts, 2015, p. 38). Though only about four percent of these
attempts are completed, over 44,000 Americans die by suicide each year, making it the
10th leading cause of death in the nation (AFSP, 2016). Despite the prevalence of suicide
attempts and deaths, communication about these matters remains scarce. Stigma
surrounding suicidality promotes a culture of silence in which people experiencing
suicidal thoughts and ideations do not share their feelings outside of close relationships.
More expansive, detailed stories of individuals’ experiences with suicidality are rarely
shared at all, making it difficult for researchers seeking to understand the phenomenon to
obtain meaningful accounts of what it means to live with the will to die.
Nonetheless, researchers in numerous fields such as sociology, psychology,
biomedicine, cultural studies, and religious studies have long sought to find and define
the ontology of self-inflicted death. Numerous theories about the basis of suicidal
behavior float through the United States’ cultural sphere, but biomedical understandings
of mental illness as neurological error hold the most clout in the mainstream. This is
largely because “the position that suicide rises as a consequence of mental illness is often
presented as an indisputable scientific and medical fact” (Marsh, 2010, p. 27).
Psychiatrists make up the bulk of government advisors on suicide-related policy; as well
1

as the majority of leaders for [inter]national suicide prevention organizations, editors for
academic journals in suicidology, and heads of suicide research centers (Marsh, 2010, p.
29). As such, millions of private and public dollars are poured into the biomedical1
industry’s research on suicide prevention each year. Even with these extraordinary efforts
and claims of scientific fact linking mental illness to suicidality, however, a concrete
biomedical understanding of what underlies suicidal behaviors remains elusive.
The definitive guide for providing mental healthcare to suicidal patients comes
from the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA’s) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM). In the previous editions of this document, suicide was listed
as a symptom of other psychiatric disorders (depression, bipolar disorder, etc.)—not as a
condition in and of itself. Now, the current edition (DSM-V) tentatively categorizes
intentional actions toward one’s own death as “suicidal behavior disorder” within the
section on “conditions for further study” (APA, 2013, p. 801). With this change, the APA
admits a crucial glitch in medical understandings of suicidal behavior and marks it as an
issue that evades current medical knowledge. In essence, what most people knew about
suicide as it relates to mental health is now medically incorrect—or at least incomplete.
Based on social science literature, it is clear that biomedical understandings of
this phenomenon are only one part of a much larger picture (Wexler & Gone, 2016;
Fullagar & O’Brien, 2016; Bergmans, Rowe, Dineen, & Johnson, 2016; Reynolds, V.,

1

The term “biomedical” is used over the more common use of “medical” to highlight that
dominant Western understandings of medicine and medical care are not universal. Not all
forms of medicine around the world define [mental] illness the same way, but the focus
of this study is on the dominant forms of the medical industry in the United States—not
forms deemed “alternative” in the mainstream sphere.
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2016). As many scholars note, medical care, mandatory reporting, and other issues
surrounding suicide are not all about science; religion and morality are heavily
intertwined as well (Jamison, 2000; Marsh, 2010). Jensen (2016) explains this link
between science and sociocultural norms through the rhetorical phenomenon of
medicalization. According to Conrad (1992), medicalization, the process by which
experiential knowledge becomes subordinate to biomedical expertise, explains how many
aspects of social life have come to be labeled as medical “disease.” This medicalization
process “emerges and folds according to dynamic rhetorical, material, and sociocultural
encounters” (Jensen, 2016, p. 2), so medical knowledge is never truly pure or unbiased.
By contrast, it is heavily intertwined with sociocultural and religious beliefs about health,
illness, morality, and the sanctity of human life (Lupton, 2012). For the study of mental
health, this means that the medical understandings of what it means to be “mentally ill”
cannot be understood as biologically deterministic; they are closely related to
sociocultural understandings of what it means to be “abnormal.” With that in mind, it is
essential to acknowledge that moralizing often persists despite medicalization, thus
situating its subjects as “both responsible for their health and yet inherently incapable of
meeting that responsibility on their own” (Jensen, 2016, p. 4). Suicidal people are
therefore trapped within a bind where they are simultaneously unavoidably ill and
decidedly morally corrupt, exempt from blame and the targets of moral criticism.
This critical argument stems from the ideological underpinnings of “crip theory”
(McRuer, 2006). This theoretical approach to understanding disability claims that in
opposition to medical models that locate impairment and pathology within the individual,
3

what actually impairs a person is living in a culture and a world that does not account for
their needs (Krieg, 2013, p. 44). “Essentially,” Krieg argues, “the person is not disabled,
but rather it is the world that is disabling” (2013, p. 44 [emphasis in original]). Though
crip theory’s emphasis on the sociocritical seems to strike a polar relationship with
biomedical understandings of disability, the two can also be used to inform, challenge,
and improve one another.
Because of this potential for more nuanced understandings, I argue that
biomedical ways of defining suicide must be matched with alternative ways of knowing
this experience. Epistemological variety is key because when a singular form of evidence
is privileged as more “truthful” than others, much of the complexity of any given matter
is lost (Holmes, Murray, Perron, & Rail, 2006). No one field may hold the key to
unlocking the “Truth” behind suicide, but interdisciplinary approaches will help uncover
and create alternative truths that hold important implications for the way humans care for,
interact with, and live as suicidal people.
Narratology, the study of stories and how their structures affect human
perception, is one of these interdisciplinary means that holds particular promise in the
realm of suicidology. In contrast to biomedical ways of knowing that emphasize
biochemical tests conducted in labs, narratives epistemologies honor theories of the flesh:
a perspective put forth by Chicana feminist scholars Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga
(1983) that privileges the body as a way and site of knowing. By honoring people’s own
complex experiences of their situations and identities, narrative practices in this context
are essentially medicalization in reverse—a sort of de-medicalization that places power
4

back in the hands of those experiencing suicidality instead of leaving that authority with
their healthcare providers. Despite the promise of such an emphasis, the field of health
communication has not addressed narrative sensemaking on the subject of suicide. No
publications on the matter currently exist, and those that address suicide in other forms do
so through more traditional methods that leave the person experiencing suicidality absent
from the meaning-making process.
With that gap in mind, adopting narrative methods is particularly relevant to the
study of suicide since most ableist cultures deem attempt survivors “insane” and do not
value tellers’ stories (Bergmans, et al., 2016; Capponi, 2003). Embracing these narratives
as significant sites of knowledge and understanding is one small step in reclaiming
attempt survivors’ minds and lives as worthy, credible, and important. This is crucial
because, as Frank asserts, “Stories do not simply describe the self; they are the self’s
medium of being” (2013, p. 53). The inverse notion that “those who do not narrate do not
have a self” (Shuman, 2010, p. 152) is a significant dehumanizing prospect for suicide
survivors. By seeking to learn about suicide through attempt survivors’ personal
narratives, the proposed study aims to [re]humanize suicide and those plagued by its
ideation within academia and the broader culture at large.
To access and co-create these alternative truths, in this study I analyze attempt
survivors’ suicide narratives, specifically those shared in conversation with and published
by the director of the online art-activist project “Live Through This” (LTT). These stories
share individuals’ backgrounds of the roots of their suicidal ideation, vivid accounts of
their suicide attempts, and the social struggles of living with such taboo internal
5

hostilities. These first-hand accounts of suicidality shared on LTT offer a more nuanced
understanding of what it means to live with the will to die from an experiential
perspective—far from the sanitized versions told (or hidden) in funeral services,
academic research, and other semi-public stages. This is lived-experience base key
because in today’s biomedical world, suicidal people are rarely granted the ability to tell
and embrace their own stories as definitional truths; they are almost always defined and
classified by biomedical professionals (Capponi, 2003). Allowing people to explain and
assign meaning to their own experiences is a seemingly simple idea, but it is rarely
embraced in formal academic research practices.
With this objective in mind, the goal of this study is threefold: (1) to bring
together, critique, and problematize numerous fields’ exiting conceptualizations of
suicide; (2) to fortify the academic study of health communication by expanding its
[post]positivist history into critical qualitative directions using crip theory as a lens; and
(3) to embrace experiential ways of knowing in the form of suicide attempt survivors’
narratives as valid and important to acknowledge and study, not only as data but also as
voices of expertise.
In order to address these three aims, I call on narrative theorizing and inquiry.
Methodologically, this entails “a deliberate inclination to seek out and discern the storied
elements within human depictions of life events,” and to “understand and convey
inherent meanings” (Yamasaki et al., 2014, p. 101). To ground this work, a review of
existing literature on the subject of suicide in social contexts is provided below. This
review first explores the rhetorical and definitional issues of “suicide” as a term, matched
6

with critical analyses of different values placed on self-inflicted deaths in its various
forms. With this criticality in mind, the cultural politics of morality historically present in
biomedicine are highlighted in order to justify the necessity of bringing a critical lens to
the study of contemporary suicidology. Next, the silencing impacts of stigma on people
living with mental illness, particularly in terms of the mentally-ill-as-dangerous
stereotype disseminated through ableist media, are examined in order to more deeply
engage the primary theoretical and methodological lens for this study: critical narrative
inquiry.
Defining Suicide
Before entering a critical discussion about suicide, it is key to begin by defining
the term and noting that not all self-induced forms of dying are regarded in the same way
(Goldsmith, Pellmar, Kleinman, & Bunney, 2002, p. 193). According to critical
suicidologists White, Marsh, Kral, and Morris (2016), “suicide cannot be easily
understood in singular, static, or acontextual terms. On the contrary, suicide and suicidal
behaviors…are deeply embedded in particular social, political, ethical, and historical
contexts” (p. 1). Different cultures regard[ed] and define[d] different sorts self-inflicted
deaths in vastly disparate ways, and the term “suicide” itself has a complex and
controversial history in the English-speaking world.
The Oxford English Dictionary points to the first use of “suicide” in the English
language in 1651, then meaning “to vindicate oneself from…inevitable Calamity.” Two
centuries after the term entered English vocabularies, sociologist Erving Goffman
broadened this definition and made the term “applied to all cases of death resulting
7

directly or indirectly from a[n]…act of the victim himself, which he knows will produce
this result,” regardless of external motives or intentions (1951 [1897], p. 44). This broad
definition included deaths such as a mother knowingly sacrificing her own life during
childbirth, a person jumping in front of a train to push a stranger from its path, or a
solider using their body to shield a civilian during an armed attack. This broad definition
is the base of the one currently held by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC); the only difference is the latter’s emphasis on intention. Specifically, the CDC
designates suicide as “death caused by self-directed injurious behavior with an intent to
die as a result of the behavior” (CDC, 2016) (emphasis mine).
This inclusion of “intent to die” is what characterizes most medical and social
definitions of suicide today—including my own. However, all three of these definitions
inform the history of suicide’s cultural conceptions in the English-speaking world.
Though a thorough exploration of various languages and cultural terms for this
phenomena is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief review of the rhetorical and
definitional issues of “suicide” as it relates to the United States is provided below. This
background is essential to mapping the meaning of the term as it impacts people dealing
with suicidality today because as new rhetorical norms come into being, previous ones
are never entirely replaced; they inexorably “linger” and impact contemporary meanings
(Koerber, 2013, p. 13). The legacy of the term is therefore essential to understanding its
current meanings, usage, and impacts in various forms and contexts.
The issue of honor in self-inflicted death. Marsh (2010) outlines the history of
understanding suicide (in Western thought) in three main phases: lenses of (1) morality;
8

(2) criminality; and (3) mental illness. Many archival texts show that the first of these,
morality, has been used to both support and condemn suicidal actions throughout history.
Prior to the colonization of what is now the United States of America and Canada,
numerous native peoples including the Eskimo and Crow accepted “altruistic suicides”
amongst the sick and elderly (Bromberg & Cassel, 1983). Such practices are not unique
to them; contemporary “Right to Die” supporters in the United Sates also use rhetorics of
benevolence to support a terminally-ill patient’s right to choose their own death, often for
the benefit of their caretakers and providers (Gunderson & Mayo, 1993). In all of these
cases, suicide is marked as an act of selflessness that promotes the wellbeing of the
broader community.
Ancient Greeks and Romans also viewed some self-inflicted deaths as symbols of
honor (Jamison, 2000). Hannibal, Brutus, Cato, and numerous other famed leaders
consumed poison rather than be captured, disgraced, or killed by their enemies, and all
were hailed for such displays of righteousness and courage. Even in the Christian Bible, a
site which many claim is anti-suicide despite the fact that no references to its
condemnation exist, there are several accounts of self-induced death in the name of honor
(e.g., Judges 9:50-54; Kings 16:15-20). Beyond that, radicalists in nearly all of the
world’s religions (e.g., Christianity, Islam, Shinto) have historically used suicide as a
means of fighting for their faiths and lands.
In all of these cases, self-inflicted deaths are not viewed as “suicides” in the
typical sense of the term. A feminist perspective highlights that these sort of deaths are
framed in a masculine light: deliberate acts in the name of self-sacrifice, bravery, and
9

duty to a greater good—thus they are acceptable and praiseworthy. There exists a deep
gap between these sorts of valiant self-inflicted deaths and those framed as feminine:
those associated mental illness, weakness, and irrationality. The latter shows the policing
function of Marsh’s (2010) ‘morality stage’ of understanding suicide. By framing suicide
as an individual failure/defect, society is able to depoliticize the actions and hide any
external factors which may contribute to the suicidal situation (Reynolds, 2016; VaidMenon, 2014).
Puar (2007) points out that this framing gap is especially clear in the suicides of
people of color—particularly when these people can be associated with Islam or
immigrant statuses. She argues that in the U.S. cultural sphere, brown “terrorists” (people
who take their own lives or enact violence in the name of a broader political struggles)
are immediately framed as queer; they are associated with the “feminine” irrationality
and weakness that runs directly opposed to hyper-masculine ideologies of American
exceptionalism despite their self-sacrificial political goals (Puar, 2007). This
demonstrates that the masculine/feminine divide in framing suicide does not necessarily
relate to the genders of those dying by their own hand, but rather to the ways in which
society views [ir]rationality through a gendered and raced lens. Considering the welldocumented link between medicalization and moralization, this historical distinction
between moral (masculine) and immoral (feminine) suicide cannot be ignored.
Addressing this binary is particularly relevant because all current biomedical conceptions
of suicide are related to mental illness; weakness and irrationality are the core—never
some sort of pure masculine honor. Moreover, over time these notions of morality have
10

been codified into religious law in numerous nations around the world, including the
United States.
Religion, law, and the criminalization of death. During 17th century, European
colonists brought Christian beliefs (primarily Protestant and Catholic) to the United
States. With these ideologies came the cultural prohibition of suicide long associated with
the Church in post-Biblical times. This religious stance against suicide is explicitly
outlined in the Catechism of the Catholic Church: “It is God who remains the sovereign
Master of life…We are stewards, not owners, of the life God has entrusted to us. It is not
ours to dispose of” (Part 3, Section 2, Article 5, #2280). The next line explicitly states
that suicide “is contrary to love for the living God” (Part 3, Section 2, Article 5, #2281).
Famed philosophers such as Martin Luther (Rettersol, 1993), John Locke (Williams,
1997), and various Puritan leaders (Kushner, 1991) echoed this pious sentiment. Within
most branches of Christianity suicidal actions remain forbidden, but the souls of those
lost are left to the mercy of God—not the judgement of Man.
Though Man was not granted the ecclesiastical right to judge suicidal souls,
humans around the world did create legal rights to do so (Jamison, 2000). Many of the
world’s nations created laws against self-inflicted death, and it remains an unlawful act in
numerous modern countries. Suicide is no longer illegal in the United States, but the
penal phrase “commit suicide” remains common nomenclature for someone dying by
their own hand. The term “commit” insinuates a criminal act—a term associated with
murder, fraud, and other actions punishable by law (Sather & Newman, 2016). This
rhetorical norm perpetuates suicide as an un unlawful act, and therefore highlights the
11

deep cultural condemnation of such deaths. Many activist circles focusing on suicide
prevention have extricated “commit” from their vocabularies, instead using terminology
like “died by suicide” to avoid adding to the stigma against those impacted by the issue
(see Reynolds, 2016, p. 172). This new rhetoric also serves as a nod to the notion that
suicide is not necessarily an internal issue, but rather a social one in which external
factors are relevant to the production of self-destructive actions. This idea of suicide as
social murder is a relatively new idea that deviates from Marsh’s (2010) third stage of
Western understandings of suicide: Mental illness.
Decriminalization: Shifting power from God to science. Following Marsh’s
(2010) timeline, contemporary understandings of suicide move beyond issues of morality
and criminality to emphasize biomedical origins. Suicide is no longer commonly viewed
a matter of spiritual demonism or unlawful rebellion, but rather an issue of chemical
origins within the human brain. This ontological change mirrored a larger cultural shift in
which the power of God was eclipsed by the power of Science during the Scientific
Revolution (Szasz, 1997, p. 138); it marked a turn in which the world was no longer ruled
by abstract faith, but rather by microscopes and human emphases on classification (i.e.,
Darwinism). Despite its near-ubiquitous embrace, Marsh (2010) and others argue that this
jump from God to Science was somewhat arbitrary. Particularly for suicide, there was no
medical discovery of pathological anatomy to support medical claims of expertise in this
arena (Marsh, 2016, p. 18).
Despite this alleged ideological metamorphosis, the purity of “science” is viewed
skeptically by many critical scholars, especially those who study race, gender, and
12

disability (e.g., Robinson, 1983; Butler, 2007; McRuer, 2006). These scholars point out
that biological “science” is often used to support oppressive ideologies such as sexism,
racism, and homophobia by giving people a so-called “empirical” base for their beliefs.
This matter is outlined in-depth later in this paper, but for the sake of this section it is key
to note that behaviors biomedically linked to “mental illnesses” in the DSM are often
argued as simply deviations from the norms for sociocultural conduct; they have been
pathologized by the “illness ideology” that permeates contemporary times (Maddux,
2009; Szasz, 1997; Geist & Dreyer, 1993). There remains a lack of cogent empirical
findings that link suicidal behaviors to actual physical or mental pathology (Hjelmeland,
Dieserud, Dyregrov, Knizek, & Leenaars, 2012). What does promote this link is the
permeation of the United States’ “cultural politics of emotion” (term coined by Puar,
2004) within biomedical science. With this in mind, embracing a more critical view of
suicide and biomedical conceptions thereof is key to fuller understandings of this
phenomenon. Analyzing attempt survivors’ narratives should provide more focus on
these sociocultural aspects of what it means to live with suicidality—what it means to
exist in a world that sees one’s mind as not only ill, but also deemed counter to the love
of God and antithetical to basic human morality. Though these ideas are social in nature,
their infiltration into biomedical practices cannot be dismissed (see Lupton, 2012).
Unpacking Cultural Politics in Biomedicine
Science is, at its core, a culturally- and historically-situated storytelling process
(Haraway, 1976). In the United States, however, the notion that “health services are
culturally constituted—both in terms of anticipated needs and in terms of how those
13

needs are addressed” is consistently overlooked, if not ignored entirely (Wexler & Gone,
2016, p. 57). Mainstream healthcare’s association with biomedical “science” means that
patients are typically encouraged to view their doctors as godly entities, and themselves
as rightfully subservient beings awaiting a treatment or cure (Charon, 2006). This power
differential has significant implications interpersonally in terms of doctor-patient
relationships, as well as in broader sociocultural senses in which science is Truth and
physicians are determined presenters thereof.
Biomedicine and notions of “normality”. Within Western biomedicine, social
understandings of appropriate behavior and normality have been almost completely
eclipsed by the so-called pathological reign (Szasz, 1997). What was once understood as
mere personal, individual action is now frequently claimed pathological; many human
behaviors are claimed disordered—regardless of biological evidence for bodily error—
whenever they deviate from the norm (Szasz, 2007). Though there is no doubt that many
important medical breakthroughs and progresses have improved human lifespans and
wellbeing, many other “advancements” are often unnecessary if not entirely
counterproductive. In the words of Bergmans, Rowe, Dineen, and Johnson (2016), “the
whole human experience is being medicalized” (p. 135). And with it, human brains are
new objects for social control.
Hayden (1993) argues that illness is defined by what is perceived to be a socially
deviant state. While this is undoubtedly valid, it is less commonly recognized that deviant
states are often perceived as signals of illness (Rowe, 2016). Maddux (2011) summarizes
this notion:
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[B]oth physical and psychological disease are inherently social constructions that
serve sociocultural goals and values and, therefore, our notions of psychological
normality/abnormality and health/illness are filtered by our assumptions about
how people should live their lives and about what constitutes a life worth living.
(p. 63)
This means that while diagnoses are often first steps in the journey toward receiving
medical treatment, they’re often also condemnations. Diagnoses reflect static,
dehumanizing understandings of a human body in which a person no longer “has” as
problem, but is a problem (Horn et al, 2007, p. 266). This rhetorical gap between a person
“having an illness” to “being ill” forms Othering, us/them dichotomies that allow people
who carry diagnostic labels to be ostracized from society (Bergmans et al., 2016, p. 138).
It also promotes the Great Origin Myth of suicidology: the implicit idea that the ultimate
origin of suicide lies within the individual—regardless of external stressors and
precursors (Oral, 1998, p. 229).
Formations of fear. This tendency toward illness ideologies is what creates the
cultural image of the American Psycho: a crazy person whose mind is so diseased that
their actions are utterly irrational…and almost always violent and unpredictable. The
person living with a (diagnosed or undiagnosed but assumed) mental illness thus becomes
an object of fear—a monster undeserving of compassion, empathy, or attempts at
understanding (Pirkis, Blood, Francis, & McCallum, 2006). This abjection is
extraordinarily relevant to social understandings of suicide, as well as academic ones.
Stigma lessens the ease of academic research in the area, including acquiring grant
money, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, and other support for such projects.
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Unfortunately, I argue that this fear—academic or otherwise—simultaneously stems from
and induces a lack of understanding.
Puar (2007) argues that despite our rhetorical use of the term (e.g., “I’m scared!”),
fear does not come from within and move outward toward an object or Other; rather, fear
works to cement a relationship between these two bodies that is already culturally
situated (p. 62). She further explains that fear “envelopes the bodies that feel it, as well as
constructs such bodies as enveloped, as contained by it” (p. 63). It therefore works to
contain certain bodies within social spaces (p. 70): sometimes symbolically as in cases of
media representations of the mentally ill as villainous, sometimes quite literally in the
cases of forcible-admission insane asylums. The “mentally insane” are not a unified
group, however. Social identities (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation, class) are all
hugely relevant to how and whether or not mental illnesses are attributed to various
bodies.
Biomedical Histories of Identity-Based Oppression
As discussed previously, science was legitimized as a source of social control in
place of many overtly religious forms of power in the 19th century. With this concurrent
empowerment of biomedicine came a long history of oppression in the name of “science”
in which biology was simply used to legitimize existing sociocultural fears. This is easily
reviewed in histories of scientism regarding gender, sexuality, and race—all of which still
remain prevalent in biomedical practices, though perhaps less visibly than in previous
years. It is important to review these identity-based histories for two reasons: First,
because suicidal people hold many varying social identities that impact their experiences;
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and second, because, echoing crip theory perspectives, the identity of “suicidal” itself
may also be framed as a site of identity-based oppression—one that deserves similar
scrutiny to others such as sexism, racism, homophobia, transphobia and the like. Each of
these is discussed below.
Gender: Hysteria, transphobia, and the psychopathology of deviance. Many
feminist scholars argue that the Scientific Revolution was simply another manifestation
of patriarchy, claiming that modern science was “inherently masculine and therefore
driven to conquer nature and women’s bodies simultaneously” (Cody, 2010, p. 214). This
may seem like a bold claim, but even a basic glance at the history of gender-based
medicine illuminates this propensity quite deftly. Nineteenth century expert medical
discourses of the “hysterical female body” marked all humans with vaginas incapable of
rational thought or logical action due to their tendencies toward what was deemed excess
emotionality (Barky, 1988; Beechy & Donald, 1985; Foucault, 1980). Beyond just
tainting all women with this propensity toward insanity in the sociocultural sphere,
“hystericism” was a medically diagnosable condition which even possessed a treatment:
the use of what are now called vibrators to sexually stimulate a woman—of course by a
[male] physician in a medical office—in hopes of easing her high-strung mind (Maines,
2001). Consent within this “treatment” remains a foggy ethical arena in which sexual
assault was likely medically-induced.
The medicalization of childbirth serves as another example of sexism in
biomedicine. Despite the fact that women had been giving birth without medical
intervention since the dawn of the existence of homo sapiens, the biomedical field
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quickly marked women incapable of knowing their own bodies and in need of masculine
help (by obstetric doctors who were almost always male). Practices such as shackling,
forced cesareans, twilight sleep, Pitocin cycling and other modes of controlling the birth
process all suppressed women’s birthing power through matrices of masculine and
heterosexual dominance (Pollock, 1999, p. 10). Though in some cases prenatal health
care increases the survival rates of babies and aids high-risk pregnancies, these external
controls are often placed upon pregnant women regardless of their own and their babies’
situations (Lake, 2008). The issue rests within that fact, not within biomedical assistance
for women and babies who actually require it to survive.
The overwhelming biological essentialism which marked women (people
assigned female at birth) as inherently weak, irrational, and in constant need of care is the
same ideology that promotes transphobia within the medical community. Though the
DSM-V marked a shift in this, previous editions of the APA’s venerated text marked
being transgender as a disorder (Krieg, 2013). Having a gender identity that did not align
with the sex assigned at birth was deemed a psychological disease. Because of the
“treatments”—social (being forced to live as the assigned gender) and medical
(conversion therapies)—that followed the diagnosis of “gender identity disorder,” to this
day nearly half of all trans people attempt suicide in their lifetimes (Haas, Rodgers, &
Herman, 2014). This example highlights the dangers of biomedicine’s sociocultural base;
it shows what people fear—what is Other—can be directly harmed, if not killed, by
medicalization.
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These examples of hystericism “treatments,” childbirth interventions, and
transphobic therapies serve to highlight links between [cis]sexism and medicine—
essentially the medicalization of patriarchy. In relation to suicidality, understanding this
is essential because it brings forth questions of what could be called the medicalization of
morality. If women and trans people were (and oftentimes still are) “ill” because their
identities did not align with society’s definitions of normality, perhaps suicidal people are
similarly defined as “unwell” because their thoughts and feelings seem to run counter to
most sociocultural understandings of acceptable behavior.
Sexuality: Queer associations and criminality. This medicalization of
Otherness is also exemplified by the medical field’s history of “treating” queerness.
Though same-sex intercourse and other sexual acts and attractions have been documented
throughout world history, their condemnation by the Church, and thus Western
biomedicine, quickly made same-sex romantic/sexual feelings a diagnosable condition
with the rise of medical power. Although the APA removed homosexuality from the
DSM in 1973, the previous edition of the document marked it as a diagnosable—and thus
treatable—disorder (Krieg, 2013). Conversion or “reparative” therapies including brain
surgery, electric shock therapy, chemical castration, and psychoanalytic counseling were
commonly performed in medical offices (Dean, 2014). Of course, these attempts at
“curing” homosexuality were more a sociocultural treatment than a medical one.
Throughout the 1950s (the height of nuclear families and conversion therapies),
anti-gay public service announcements about “the homosexuals” were commonplace.
One called “Boys Beware,” which was produced with and narrated by a local police
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department, warns young boys of the dangers of hitch-hiking—not because of potential
criminal drivers, but because they might be picked up by “a homosexual.” The PSA
follows the fictional story of Jimmy: a boy who falls victim to what was described in the
film as a “sick man” afflicted with “a sickness that was not visible like smallpox, but no
less dangerous and contagious: a sickness of the mind…a homosexual.” In this PSA and
in the cultural sphere at large, same-sex desire was a form of perversion conflated with
pedophilia and bestiality (see Nicoll, 2014). When biomedicine came to charge, it is not
surprising then that diagnoses and treatments would take advantage of such a deeplycarved cultural fear. Of course, there is no known biological defect or “cause” of samesex desire and it is now known within the medical community as a “natural biological
variant” in humans (Vernon, 2012). From a critical standpoint, it is possible that
suicidality is similar in nature, that it is a “natural variant” in humans that frightens the
majority who do not experience it.
Race: Blackness and genetic inferiority. Though perhaps less frequently cited
than the history of gender- and sexuality-based oppressions within science, race is a
significant category in this arena as well. Critical race scholars have documented the
massive impact of “science” upon process of racialization. Much like in the previouslydescribed cases of oppression, white supremacy existed far before biomedical science. As
“white” explorers journeyed into areas where people’s skin color differed from their own,
they quickly made justifications for the subservience of such “discovered” (native)
people (Robinson, 1983). The larger process of colonialism required narratives of brown
and black inferiority to maintain its power (Gonder, 2004), and anthropologists have long
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described people of color as antiquated, uncivilized beasts (Orbe, Warren, & Cornwell,
2000).
By the time genetics became a scientific study, racial difference had become a
biological concern. Miscegenation laws and other forms of segregation were justified by
an alleged genetic difference between white and black people. In Genetics and Man
(1953), C. D. Darlington argued that “equality in the physical, intellectual and cultural
capacities of such [racial] groups” is “make-believe” (p. 259). Though there was no
biological evidence supporting such claims, marking people of color as scientifically
subordinate to white folks was common practice. Remnants of such “biomedical” claims
manifest in numerous jokes in today’s United States society, including political cartoons
of black leaders displayed as monkeys (playing off the “missing link” stereotype) and the
increased murders of black men by police officers (assuming the men’s irrationality and
bestial nature). Once again, science—the unbiased and pure lens it is purported to be—
serves as a source of sociocultural control and oppression.
Taking these three examples of gender, sexuality, and race into consultation with
one another, it is clear that the role of biomedicine in addressing suicide and “mental
health” must be questioned more critically. Since mental illness is often framed as an
identity in itself (i.e., “She is mentally ill,” or “They are psycho”), being critical of the
rhetorical and sociocultural impacts of its labeling is key. Medicalization transfers what is
viewed as “abnormal” into a diagnosable illness, effectively containing deviations and, in
turn, deviants as such. This directly impacts how society comes to know people—in this
case those experiencing suicidality—and their ways of being in the world. This notion
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has been addressed in relation to mental health numerous times in the past (e.g., Szasz,
1984; Szasz, 1988; Szasz, 1996; Szasz, 1997), but such claims have always met staunch
resistance.
Mental health: A hidden site of biomedical oppression? Thomas Szasz rocked
the psychiatric world in the early 1970s with his claims that the field’s medicalization of
the mind was unscientific and unbased. His central text The Myth of Psychotherapy:
Mental Health as Religion, Rhetoric, and Repression (1979) caused significant uproar
with claims that mental illness simply did not exist in any medical sense. Instead, Szasz
argued that mental illness was simply a metaphor for human problems in living: “The
‘diseased mind’ is a metaphor, a mistake, a myth” (Szasz, 2007, p. xix). He further
argued that this medicalization of the Other (so-called mentally ill patient) functions to
control and punish, not to treat anything that helps that person in their own rite (p. xvi).
While Szasz’s positions are radical and certainly contestable, his arguments
highlight the need to be increasingly critical of the often unquestioned power held by
biomedical mental healthcare practices. For example, mental hospitals—places where
people are oftentimes sent against their will—are structured much like prisons, echoing
the criminal/immoral sentiments surrounding mental “illness” (Whitehead, 1979).
Containment rather than compassion is the norm created by confinement chambers,
locked doors, bars, shackles, and fences barring patients from the outside world. Patients,
much like prisoners, are also forced to take medications, food, and liquids into their
bodies regardless of whether or not they agree to consume them (Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174 [2003]). Occupants of such facilities are also barred from
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their typical clothing (i.e. anything with strings is taken away, including shoes),
technological devices, and contact with outsiders during psychiatric holds known as
“suicide watches” (Carrigan & Lynch, 2003). While this sort of containment is meant to
be a treatment focused on the preservation of life, it eerily resembles the “treatment” of
criminals in the penal system.
Beyond the walls of such asylums, many of the outpatient “treatments” prescribed
by biomedical doctors for so-claimed mental health disorders are experimental (Insel,
2012); many of the drugs can make their consumers severely ill, and can even lead to
death. Though this is not exceptionally different from medications and treatments for
physical health conditions, consent marks a massive divide. Adults with physical health
conditions must consent to treatment therefor. By contrast, adults with mental health
conditions can be quickly deemed unfit to make such decisions, and thus can be thrust
into treatment, often residential in nature, without their own approval (see U.S. Supreme
Court cases Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S.Ct. 2452, U.S.Pa., 1982; Mills v. Rogers, 102
S.Ct. 2442 U.S., 1982; Rennie v. Klein, 102 S.Ct. 3506 U.S., 1982).
In fact, most schools, hospitals, and elder care centers have policies that force
staff members to report incidents in which people share thoughts of self-harm or suicide
(Lab & Lab, 2010). In broader legal terms, if a patient or student discloses that they are
planning to kill themselves and a staff member explicitly agrees to keep this plan a secret,
they can be charged with assisting self-murder, and therefore may be found guilty of
manslaughter in many states (e.g., Florida § 782.08). Beyond these legal liabilities, the
ethics of breaking privacy expectations in the name of preserving life are well23

understood. If a person needs urgent medical care but is unwilling or unable to pursue it,
they may require an outside push. It must be noted however that despite the positive
aspects of this potentially life-preserving act, many people considering suicide view
reporting policies as deterrents to disclosure and prefer to stay silent about their thoughts
(NAMI, 2012)—often for fear of the dehumanization that comes with forced
hospitalization and treatment.
Even if suicidal people do not fear medical interventions, the social ostracization
associated with being “crazy” (read: mentally ill, which is assumed when a person
discloses suicidal thoughts or actions) is a massive barrier to sharing one’s experiences
and thoughts. The stigma surrounding these subjects makes them very difficult to study
and analyze in meaningful ways. Before proposing a new method of attempting to take
on such a task, the role of stigma as a barrier to current understandings of suicide is
addressed below.
Stigma as a Barrier to Understanding Suicide
Though not specific to the topic of suicide, there is considerable literature
surrounding issues of stigma and isolation as they relate to social abjection. The most
broadly cited understanding of this comes from the work of sociological researcher
Erving Goffman. He defined stigma as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified
from full social acceptance” (Goffman, 1963, p. 9). In contrast to earlier works that
pointed to individual abnormalities as the cause of social denial, Goffman argued that a
language of relationships must be highlighted when discussing stigma because an
attribute that stigmatizes one person often functions to “confirm the usualness of another”
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(Goffman, 1963, p. 5). In other words, what is “normal” is constructed in relation to what
is “abnormal”; the two are intimately intertwined.
Recognizing this social base is essential to understanding the communicative
function of stereotyping, a specific manifestation of stigma that is crucial to work on
suicidality. Stereotypes serve as sense-making devices that allow people to make
assumptions about relational others based on socially-assigned meanings of [un]desirable
characteristics (Goffman, 1963). However, the objective of these typecasts is “not to
reflect or represent a reality but to function as a disguise, or mystification, of objective
social relations” (Carby, 1987). This process can have grave consequences for people
living with mental illness, who are often stereotypically marked as “dangerous,
incompetent, unable to care for themselves, and childlike” (Caputo & Rouner, 2011).
These labels are especially harmful for people experiencing suicidality because such tags
promote a dangerous spiral of social ostracism that discourages people from speaking out
about their struggles, which ultimately bars them from access to proper care…and leads
to increased death counts. To address the gravity of these stereotypes, a brief review of
the mentally-ill-as-dangerous typecast is provided below.
Before continuing, it must be acknowledged that not all people with mental
illnesses (PWMIs) are suicidal, and (arguably) not all people who kill themselves are
mentally ill. The purpose of reviewing stereotypes against PWMIs is not to cement a link
between the two. Rather, it is to acknowledge how biomedical conceptions of suicide as a
product of mental illness are enmeshed with sociocultural understandings of what it
means to be “crazy” or “deranged.” This conflation between being “psycho” (violent and
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irrational) and being suicidal (seeking to harm oneself, not others) creates a harsh barrier
to accessing, receiving, and providing compassionate care—medical or social in nature.
The dehumanization that follows any sort of “mentally ill” marker is exemplified in
American mass media.
Under the guise of protecting society from their alleged threat, the construction of
the psychotic villain normalizes an ironic culture of physical and emotional violence
against people suffering from mental illness. This pattern is frequently exemplified by
mainstream media rhetoric surrounding mass shooters (e.g., gunmen at Virginia Tech
[2007], the Aurora Theater [2012], Sandy Hook Elementary School [2012]). The actions
of these aggressors (typically white men, since people of color are usually deemed
“terrorists”) are almost always blamed on mental illness in breaking news reports—far
before accurate knowledge of their medical statuses can be ascertained (Metzl &
MacLeish, 2015). In response to this assumptive trend, psychological researchers Metzl
and MacLeish (2015) conducted a vast review of literature on the subject of violence and
mental health. They summarized their findings with the following:
Four assumptions frequently arise in the aftermath of mass shootings in the
United States: (1) that mental illness causes gun violence, (2) that psychiatric
diagnosis can predict gun crime, (3) that shootings represent the deranged acts of
mentally ill loners, and (4) that gun control “won’t prevent” another Newtown
(Connecticut school mass shooting). Each of these statements is certainly true in
particular instances. Yet, as we show, notions of mental illness that emerge in
relation to mass shootings frequently reflect larger cultural stereotypes and
anxieties about matters such as race/ethnicity, social class, and
politics…‘[M]entally ill’ ceases to be a medical designation and becomes a sign
of violent threat. (p. 240) (emphasis mine)
This shift from “mental illness” as a medical classification to a label of impending danger
isolates those living under the grips of the term, regardless of their individual actions.
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While indeed the behaviors of some people struggling with mental illness do align
with some aspects of their stigmatized identity, in this case stereotypical violence, the
American Psychological Association reported in a 2014 study that only 7.5 percent of
crimes committed by people with serious mental disorders were directly related to
symptoms of mental illness (Peterson et al., 2014). By contrast, people with psychiatric
disabilities and illnesses are far more likely to be targets than perpetrators of violent
corporeal crime (Appleby et al., 2001); they’re 2.5 times more likely to be attacked,
raped, or mugged than the general population (Hiday, 1999). In essence, the backlash
produced by the mentally-ill-as-dangerous stereotype is largely unfounded—particularly
for suicidal people who seek to harm themselves, not others. Based on this notion as well
as the extensive review on the rhetorical medicalization of suicide, I review current
norms for studying this phenomenon before introducing a narrative theoretical base for
the proposed study aimed at disrupting the silence surrounding this suicidality.
Definitional Debates and Cultural Politics in Science: Where Do We Go from Here?
As the above literature illuminates, understanding suicide as a medical malady or
a social transgression—or some combination thereof—is not a simple process. Even
defining “suicide” as a term is difficult because the word brings a host of historically- and
culturally-situated meanings that differ vastly depending on its context in space and time.
Despite this variability, the understanding of suicide as linked to biomedical/neurological
mental illness is dominant in most U.S. medical and sociocultural circles. This claim of
pathological origin is not backed by extant neurological research, but this does not mean
such an internal cause is impossible; rather, it means that researchers must question the
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domination of such a pathological understanding. Critical suicidologists and health
communication researchers alike must attend to the complex history of identity-based
oppressions within the medical field as well as the stigma surrounding suicidality in order
to form more nuanced understandings of such an uncertain and convoluted phenomenon.
In order exemplify this critical turn in my own work, I embrace narrative and crip
theorizing as modes for grounding the analysis of suicide stories. Such critical qualitative
approaches within the health communication field remain less common and less accepted
than their quantitative counterparts (Thompson, Cusella, & Southwell, 2014), so adding
crip narrative methods and theories helps expand the field while simultaneously growing
academic understandings of suicide as a topic. With the call for more critical approaches
to studying health communication in mind, the relevance of narrative and crip theorizing
to my analysis is discussed below. This review serves as a guide toward the formation of
my research question, beginning with a problematization of the current research norms
within the field.
Narrative and crip theorizing as grounding the analysis of suicide stories. The
vast majority of published research in the field of health communication remains
quantitative and post-positivist in nature (Thompson et al., 2014). It is indisputable that
these studies have made significant contributions to the field (White et al., 2016) and
helped improve healthcare and in many ways. For suicidology in particular, quantitative
risk factor studies have helped produce tools for social workers to better predict suicide in
their clients (e.g., Sánchez, 2001). Such quantitative studies also tend to be more
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persuasive with policy members when it comes to making protocol and funding changes
(Berman, Ford-Gilboe, & Campbell, 1998).
However, this [post]positivist work often leaves the voices of those experiencing
health issues themselves silent; it keeps power in the hands of researchers and away from
those directly affected by illness. It also typically fails to account for critical issues
because it rarely engages with issues of power (Doucet, Letourneau, & Stoppard, 2010).
This is a significant issue since, as demonstrated previously, racism, sexism,
homophobia, and other means of oppression are always relevant and oftentimes central to
biomedical conceptualizations of illness. The continued silence of quantitative research in
this realm directly contributes to the oppressive nature of medicalization. Therefore, for
the health communication field in particular, being cognizant of how researchers
communicate with those they study is key and ironically often ignored.
Studying suicide: Shifting from empiricism to narrative. Though quantitative
research remains the norm within health communication, many scholars in the field have
begun to address this issue by embracing visual (Willer, 2012; Moletsane et al., 2009),
critical qualitative (Norwood & Turner, 2013), and narrative methods (Bute, Harter,
Kirby, & Thompson, 2010; Harter, Japp, & Beck, 2008; Weaver-Hightower, 2012).
These scholars show particular commitment to understanding health communication from
the perspective of those experiencing health issues as opposed to external assessments,
prescriptions, or analyses. Unfortunately, this drive has not been extended into health
communication work on suicide in particular. In fact, very few studies in the
communication field address suicide at all. A handful of scholars address the topic in
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terms of risk assessment (Cummins et al., 2015), media representations and reporting
(Parkins, Blood, Skehan, & Dare, 2010; Pollock & Yulis, 2010; Shäfer & Quiring, 2014),
physician-assisted suicide (Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2006), and suicide bombings
(Berkowitz, 2005). Only one study (Kenny, 2009) addresses suicide and narrative
together, but the work is rhetorically-based and emphasizes the power of argument and
credibility in public judgement of physician-assisted suicide. None of the existing
publications in health communication address suicidal individuals’ meaning-making
through narrative means.
In the narrower field of suicidology, quantitative research reigns supreme as well.
The most comprehensive (in terms of the number of articles published annually) of the
three top international journals in the field is Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior
(SLTB) (Hjelmeland, 2016, p. 32). In 2011, the journal’s Editor in Chief, famed
suicidologist Thomas Joiner, emphasized that he would include qualitative manuscripts in
the journal, but that he would prioritize quantitative studies, “without which genuine
progress [in suicide prevention] is distinctly unlikely” (p. 472). Of the next 110 articles
published in SLTB, only two contained a qualitative portion (Hjelmeland, 2016). None
were exclusively or even majority qualitative in nature.
While Joiner was correct in his claims that quantitative research is important
because it often directly influences lab funding and policy change, the lack of qualitative
inquiry in health communication, suicidology, and the rare overlaps between these fields
is important because it dismisses a great deal of valuable knowledge. Such a limiting
definition of what counts as scientific rigor results in a loss of many multifaceted and
30

historically-contingent aspects of suicide (White, 2012, p. 48). Furthermore, it does not
embrace pluralistic understandings in which multiple “truths” or realities about an issue
can be held simultaneously, which I argue is a central feature of meaningful analyses.
David Webb (2010), a suicidologist and an attempt survivor himself, explains this
issue of empiricism carefully:
The academic and professional discipline of suicidology strives hard to be an
objective science, but…it feels as if the expert ‘suicidologists’ are looking
through the wrong end of their telescope. Their remote, long-distance (objective,
empirical) view of suicide transforms the subjective reality and meaning of the
suicidal crisis of the self—that is, the actual suicidal person—into almost invisible
pinpricks in the far distance. (p. 40)
This distance, Webb (2010) argues, misses the heart of suicidology: the experiences of
those considering self-inflicted death. Alongside Webb, I argue that human-centered
research should promote better living conditions for its subjects. Narrative methods hold
particular promise in such a realm since stories themselves are often understood as
“equipment for living” in their literary form (Burke, 1973, p. 59) due to their function as
sensemaking devices (e.g., Fox, 2014).
Narrative theory: Reclaiming suicidal storysharing. As opposed to the
positivist methods employed by biomedical researchers, the narrative approach embraced
in this study works to reclaim people’s own experiences as valid sites of knowledge. It
[re]places the power of authorship in the hands of suicide attempt survivors themselves as
opposed to leaving it with physicians and clinicians. This ability to write one’s own story
is key because as Harter attests, “Health care is shaped ultimately by which stories are
heard and taken seriously, and what sense is made of those stories” (2009, p. 141). Since
people experiencing suicidality themselves have unique perspectives on their own needs
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and circumstances, this story-based method allows them to decide what is and is not
relevant to their care. Furthermore, narrative practices embrace a determined effort not to
pathologize individuals, which is central to the goals of this work (Sather & Newman,
2016, p. 115).
Narrative also rejects the silence induced by the stigmas surrounding suicide.
Lorde (1984) addresses the fears associated with speaking in such a fragile environment.
“We fear the visibility without which we cannot truly live,” she claims (p. 42). Though
there are certainly dangers in the telling, there are also dangers in the silence. “My
silences had not protected me,” she writes. “Your silence will not protect you…[W]e all
share[] a war against the tyrannies of silence” (Lorde, 1984, p. 41). Though these words
were initially referencing issues of misogynoir and racist oppression, when applied to the
topic of suicide, Lorde’s sentiments redefine speaking about “mental illness” or thoughts
of self-inflicted death as brave acts in the face of persecution. This is particularly relevant
for people of color, for whom talking about suicide and mental illness is often even more
highly stigmatized than it is for white people (Walker, 2017).
This shift in framing suicide stories from weak admissions of brokenness to brave
assertions of empowerment helps eclipse what Tuck (2009) refers to as damage-centered
research. Instead of positivistically researching people as subjects who are “depleted,
ruined, and helpless” (Tuck, 2009, p. 409), a narrative approach honors their power as
subjects who make sense of their own experiences and thus contribute to the body of
knowledge surrounding their suicidal labeling. It also allows them to participate in their
own sensemaking as an avenue toward healing.
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Storytelling as sensemaking. The individual teller’s involvement in the narrative
process highlights storytelling as an avenue toward “consciousness, engagement,
responsibility, and ethicality” (Charon, 2006, p. 131). Strength and empowerment reside
in the sharing of hidden stories, particularly when such tales are highly stigmatized.
Being able to construct one’s own life narrative helps “enable a sense of control in the
face of threat and disorder,” particularly in such chaos as that presented when one
experiences suicidality (Sharf, Harter, Yamasaki, & Haidet, 2011, p. 38). This sense of
personal control can have life-saving implications; Jones claims that storytelling is a
“survival strategy for people who have been historically marginalized” (2015, p. 773)
(emphasis mine). The choice to use narrative methods for this research is therefore as
much about the activist potential of storysharing as it is about inquiry.
Personal empowerment aside, narratives are not merely individualistic accounts of
experience. Langellier (1989) explains: “All personal narratives have a political function
in that they produce a certain way of seeing the world which privileges certain interests
(stories and meanings) over others, regardless of whether or not they contain explicit
political content” (p. 271). Self-narrations are never separate from sociocultural
influence. For the means of this the proposed study in particular, instead it must be noted
that personal narrative is a highly social and cultural meaning-making performance—not
an isolated event. In their narrative choices of characters, plot, and setting, suicidal
storytellers essentially articulate what they believe is important to study within
suicidology. These narrators hold the “transformative power to assert self-definitions
about who matters and what matters: the existence, worth and vitality of a person or
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group as meanings not otherwise available to an audience” (Langellier, 1999, p. 134).
Forcing an external judgement on what is important to study is no longer necessary with
this method; such decisions are made by the participants themselves.
Narrative as dialogic. Despite the fact that narrators have the choice to construct
their stories how they see fit, narrative is not a one way-process. Stories are social
constructions based upon their narrators’ interactions—both real and imagined
(Honeycutt, 2014)—with external others who possess socioculturally-bound notions of
what it means to be suicidal, mentally ill, or “crazy.” This does not mean the stories are
fabrications, but rather that “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an
individual person; it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the
process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 110). “Truth,” perhaps more
aptly, truths, are products of social and interpersonal meaning-making.
The body of work produced by Russian literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin,
contemporarily dubbed “dialogism,” argues that all utterances are intertextual; each one
is a link in a complex chain of others, all of which are formed in relation to those that
precede it (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 94). This argument is based on the notion that no individual
speaker is the “biblical Adam” who describes objects for the first time; rather, she builds
her utterance—in this case, a narrative—within existing systems of meaning (Bakhtin,
1986, p. 93). For suicidal storytellers, this means grappling with narrative untellability, an
issue put forth by Shuman (2005) who argues that some stories are tellable only if the
narrator is willing to live with existing categories for interpreting their experience (p. 7).
In other words, stories must be told within specific frameworks (i.e., beginning, middle,
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and end) and commonly accepted truths (i.e., that suicide represents an error in morality
or health) if audiences are to understand these accounts.
Narrative untellability is particularly relevant for topics not often shared in
narrative form—like suicide. For example, those who do not see their suicidality as
biomedically-based will have to build their arguments around that norm, knowing that
their truth may not make sense in a world that sees the ontology of suicide so uniformly.
Likewise, someone who believes their suicidality is the product of heterosexism and
homophobia will have to form their story in such a way that addresses the fact that many
audience members will not see their identities as valid sources of oppression, or even
valid in their own rite at all. This narrator-audience (or assumed audience) relationship
will be key to the analysis suicide stories in the proposed study.
Research Question
In bringing together, critiquing, and problematizing many fields’ extant
conceptualizations of suicide with particular regard to the historical links between
medicalization and moralization, I aimed to articulate a clear path to how the
contemporary stigma surrounding suicide came into being. Like many other
socioculturally-deemed “shameful” health issues, suicide is a complex phenomenon
linked to the cultural politics of many religious, legal, moral, and medical epistemologies.
The overarching issue within this epistemological complexity does not lie in its
multifacetedness, but rather in the fact that suicide as a phenomenon is almost entirely
understood from the perspective of outsiders (historically including priests, lawyers, and
philosophers). Today, biomedical physicians possess the ultimate power of defining what
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it means to be suicidal, what causes suicidal ideations and attempts. Their largelyunquestioned dominance in this arena is problematic because the biomedical field has a
long history of using “science” to explain and justify the oppression of societal Others—
perhaps now including suicidal people who are often dehumanized as psychotic,
deranged outsiders.
In this study, I seek [re]empower suicide attempt survivors as legitimate sources
of knowledge in order to curb the dominance of biomedical evaluations. Analyzing firstperson narratives allows me to shift the power to make sense of and define suicide away
from biomedical practitioners and into the hands of those who know suicidality firsthand.
In order to understand these survivors’ sensemaking processes, I pose an overarching
research question that engages with biomedical conceptions of suicide while also opening
opportunities for alternative ways of knowing that embrace crip theory’s conception of
mentally ill people as Others:
How do attempt survivors narrate their experiences of suicidality in ways that
reflect and/or deny biomedical and sociocritical/crip understandings of suicide?
This research question honors narratives shared by suicide attempt survivors and offers a
crucial piece of anti-stigma activism as well as a unique opportunity to expand
definitional comprehensions of suicide as a whole. This work also aims to fortify the
academic study of health communication by expanding its [post]positivist history into
critical qualitative directions.
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Chapter Two — Cripping Narrative Methods
Because biomedical definitions of suicide reign supreme in the United States,
studying what suicide might mean outside of them—for instance, what it means to
attempt survivors and those experiencing it firsthand—proves difficult. Narrative
methods allow me to analyze and understand how suicide attempt survivors make sense
of their experiences through storytelling. However, these methods don’t inherently
account for systems of power that my research question aims to confront. To address that
lack, I add crip theory to the mix, effectively “cripping” narrative methods. As Sandahl
(2003) describes, the act of cripping exposes “the arbitrary delineation between normal
and defective and the negative social ramifications of attempts to homogenize humanity”
(p. 37). In other words, cripping narrative methods allows me to emphasize uniqueness
over homogeneity and disrupt the notion that suicidality is inherently abnormal. This
practice also brings light to the harm of creating a “single story” for what it means to be
suicidal.
In this chapter, I describe the process of cripping narrative methods more in-depth
as it relates to my particular study. Before doing this, I first discuss my dataset of suicide
attempt survivors’ narratives and describe how these stories were collected. I then explain
my iterative methodological approach that blends narrative and crip analyses through
primary- and secondary-cycle coding. Finally, I detail peer data conferencing as the
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validity check measure that helped ensure my research methods and the findings resulting
from them were sound.
Suicide attempt survivors’ stories as data. Despite my seemingly simple goal of
honoring suicide attempt survivors’ stories as sources of legitimate knowledge, the
process of actually getting access to these stories proved a difficult matter. Many times
survivors willing to share their suicide stories do so in very limited formats (such as
anonymous online posts), reflecting their own fears and corporeal dangers related to
stigma. Most websites that host suicide attempt narratives are filled with posts by faceless
users, and these stories oftentimes are not shared with activist goals of promoting
understanding; they are cries for help or sites to vent when close relational others do not
or cannot listen. It is true that stories often serve both of these functions at once, and I do
not seek to belittle narratives shared for solely therapeutic reasons. This is a vastly
important role of storysharing. However, I wanted to be sure that the stories used in this
study were not cries for help that I would be exploiting in a voyeuristic, unethical way.
With that sensitivity in mind, data for this project are transcriptions of narrative
interviews from “Live Through This” (LLT): an online “collection of [photographic]
portraits and stories of suicide attempt survivors, as told by those survivors”
(livethroughthis.org). I chose this platform as my source for data because all of the LTT
storytellers pointedly participated in the site’s project in order to help others better
understand suicide, and they specifically sought the opportunity to share their stories
publically. I believe my research project honors these narrators’ goals as well as those
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posed by LTT without appropriating or exploiting content that was posted/made for other
means.
Furthermore, from the photographs on the site it appears that a variety of races,
genders, sexualities, socioeconomic classes, and ages are likely represented by the LTT
narrators. These will not be assumed or collected for demographic means in this research
project, however; they will only be analyzed as they are present in and relevant to the
narrators’ stories and the research question. Having a wide range of identities represented
in the data is important to getting a fuller picture of suicide without restricting it to
dominant norms of whiteness, heterosexuality, masculinity, and the like.
Generally, the narratives on the LTT website reveal a host of different storytelling
styles, political investments, and personal goals. Many of the stories begin with
childhood reflections on times when the narrators first encountered the notion of suicide
or understood that humans could kill themselves. Some narratives talk about the
background of stresses (often abuse and trauma) leading to an attempt, or their efforts to
tell others they were suffering. Several storytellers also include explicit information on
choosing methods for their attempts to die and the thought processes immediately
preceding these attempts. Because of this variety, the LTT narratives highlight that no
singular image of a “suicide story” is possible to define.
The fact that these narratives are available publicly online and the interviews
gathering them were conducted prior to this project by an outside party (described below)
also allows me as a researcher with no clinical mental healthcare background to hear
these stories without placing participants at risk. Though this technically removes the
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potential for me as a researcher to place people in harm’s way, I am still concerned with
the ethicality of how the narratives were gathered prior to my analysis. I wanted to be
sure that the ways in which these stories were collected were careful to minimize risk of
those involved. This concern was shared by the LTT project’s founder: Des’Rae L. Stage,
a self-described photographer, writer, and suicide awareness activist.
“Live Through This” data collection methods. In order to sit down with a
suicide survivor and record their story, Stage requires that all story-sharers be over 18
years of age (the legal age of consent for most medical procedures), be willing to use
their full name and likeness (not concerned about being “exposed”), and be at least one
year out from their most recent suicide attempt (less likely to be retraumatized) (LTT,
2017). Furthermore, all participants submit an online form requesting to be a part of the
project, so they are the ones initiating participation in this project; survivors aren’t
recruited or incentivized to speak. All of these efforts help create relatively safe
environments without restricting participants so much that their stories were muted or
altered in order to be accepted.
In addition to these careful protocols and their efforts to minimize risk to LTT
participants, Stage is also trained in various crisis intervention techniques.2 These
techniques provide tools for her to conduct interviews in ethical and safe ways, which
was important to me because the LTT project was not approved by an Institutional
Review Board or any other sort of formal ethics committee since Stage is not an

2

These crisis intervention trainings include QPR Gatekeeper Training and Applied
Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), per Stage’s curriculum vitae (available on
the LTT website).
40

academic or medical provider by trade. I reasoned that as the sole interviewer for LTT,
Stage’s background in crisis intervention as well as undergraduate and graduate work in
psychology act as further safeguards for the suicide attempt survivors with whom she
interacts. Stage also travels around the country to collect these narratives, and often
conducts her interviews in parks and other public locations near where her interviewees
live. This likely means the participants are closer to their systems of support if they
should need help after telling their stories.
Beyond these external efforts to learn about suicidality and protect those with
histories thereof, Stage also has a rich personal and relational history with suicide.
Stage’s own suicide attempt coupled with the loss of friends to suicide was the major
catalyst for her to begin working on LTT. In February of 2013, she raised $23,000 via a
Kickstarter campaign to begin the project with the goal of collecting portraits and
narratives of suicide attempt survival around the country. In the years since then, Stage
has collected over 160 narratives, and the project has been featured in many popular
media outlets such as Newsweek, The New York Times, Associated Press, NPR, and
Upworthy—all of which praise the work for its stigma-busting potential (see Carey,
2014; Clark, 2014; Aschwanden, 2014; Crary, 2013; Mariani, 2015). She also frequently
presents projects at the American Association of Suicidology’s annual conferences in
addition to giving invited talks on the subject of suicide prevention at various colleges
and universities around the United States.
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When interviewing attempt survivors for her project, Stage leaves the structure of
the narratives almost entirely up to the survivors. What both parties say is audio-recorded
and later transcribed verbatim. Stage describes this process:
First, the survivor [introduces themselves and] tells their story. I let them go at
their own pace and include only the details they wish to share. I try not to
interrupt—I prefer it to be as purely from the survivor's perspective as possible
and don't want to throw it off course. I do often ask questions at the end, but it's
more of a conversation than an interview. There is no structure, and the content of
the questions comes from the story. Everything is recorded. (LTT, 2017)
From my own reading of the transcripts, Stage’s initial prompt does not offer direction
other than asking the participants to tell their stories “as they see fit to tell them.” After
they are finished telling the story, Stage often asks questions about the narrators’
involvements with healthcare institutions, including hospitalizations, use of medications,
and whether or not these things were consensual and helpful. Examples of these questions
in her interviews include: “Have you ever been on meds?” (AU) 3 and “What was being
hospitalized like for you?” (MR). She also prompts discussions with statements in
addition to questions. For example, Stage probes with prompts such as “I want to hear
your thoughts on mental illness not being a disease” (AU), and “Talk to me about your
view on mental illness. Does it exist? Is it relevant?” (DJ).
While Stage includes these sorts of probing questions in nearly all of the
interviews, she never leads with these questions, nor does she ask them in ways that
directly criticize these healthcare systems; she simply opens space for peoples’
interactions with biomedicine to shine through—for better or for worse. This provides

3

Each citation from LTT is marked with the initials of the narrator. A full list of the
storytellers whose narratives I included in my analysis is available in Appendix A.
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particularly fertile ground for this research study because the narrative-conversations
allow Stage to probe into issues of biomedicine without overtly displaying an agenda that
would sway participants to share certain perspectives while hiding others.4 However the
narrators describe their experience with biomedical institutions, Stage seems to mirror
their perspectives and validate whatever stance they take. For example, one teller detailed
her fears of hospitalization: “I know where I’ll be taken: I’ll end up in an emergency
room, and if there’s no room in the mental hospital, I’ll sit in an emergency room for
three days. And that’s the big, scary thing” (EO). The narrator expressed concern over the
care she would receive based on past histories of hospitalization and poor treatment
within the biomedical system. Mirroring the colloquial language of her interviewee,
Stage’s response was blunt: “Something a lot of us talk about is how the system's so
fucked up that if we get into it, we get mistreated a lot of the time, and that's if we get
into it at all.” “Yeah, exactly,” continued the participant, who then proceeded to elaborate
on her perspective (EO). As this exemplifies, Stage reflects the standpoints of her
participants and often uses this validation as a way to probe more deeply into the
perspectives—but not to alter them.
Overall, Stage’s LTT narrative interview techniques provide a solid base upon
which to set a research study because of her attention to recruitment ethics, unbiased

4

Stage does not share political leanings or goals on the LTT website. She does, however,
have a statement of activist intent for the project: “The intention of Live Through This is
to show that everyone is susceptible to depression and suicidal thoughts by sharing
portraits and stories of real attempt survivors—people who look just like you. These
feelings could affect your mom, your partner, or your brother, and the fear of talking
about it can be a killer” (LTT, 2017).
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interaction, and probing questions. She carefully reduces the risk to her participants by
setting rules about who can share their stories on her site. Following an open-ended
prompt, the interactions she has with the suicide attempt survivor-storytellers mirror the
perspectives of these tellers. This allows her to support the interviewees and probe into
their sensemaking processes more deeply through her follow-up questions. All of this
contributes not only to a mine of rich qualitative data, but also a space in which suicide
survivors are valued as experts of their own experience—and of suicide more broadly. As
opposed to collecting data from biomedical practitioners or chemical tests, LTT offers an
activist stage that [re]empowers people dealing with suicide to define what that means
and what creates such feelings for themselves.
Data Analysis
To narrow down the vastness of the data available on LTT, I began by saving all
of the published narratives as PDFs on my computer. I then sorted the files by name (all
were titled with the names of the storytellers) and numbered them in alphabetical order.
Next, I used a random number generator to select twenty of the stories for analysis with
the understanding that if theoretical saturation was not reached, I would add additional
narratives to the data set. The selected narratives ranged from two to 34 pages in length,
altogether resulting in 236 single-spaced pages of data. After randomly selecting these
files, I printed and placed them in a binder so I could read and code them without the
distractions of my computer.
To analyze the binder of LTT narratives, I embraced an iterative approach (Tracy,
2013) based on narrative sensemaking (Yamasaki, Sharf, & Harter, 2014) and crip theory
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frameworks (McRuer, 2006). This allowed me to bring extant literature and personal
reflexivity to my analysis process without sacrificing norms for qualitative data analysis
involved in careful and thorough coding processes. After finishing primary and secondary
coding, I then used peer data conferencing to validate both my analysis procedures and
the findings that came through them. These processes are reviewed in greater depth in the
following sections.
Iterative approach. First, I began with a data immersion phase. To submerge
myself in the stories, I read and re-read the collected narratives to grasp the breadth of the
data and what was included (and excluded) in the narratives. I then conducted each of the
following coding steps on the narratives. I reached theoretical saturation (see Glaser &
Strauss, 1967) about three-quarters of the way through the twenty narratives, but
continued the coding/analysis process to ensure this saturation was solid.
To analyze the narratives, I used an iterative approach that alternated between
emic/emergent readings of the data and an etic/external joining of existing theories,
knowledges, and explanations (Tracy, 2013, p. 184). This meant I was able to honor what
the narrators shared (what emerged from their stories) as well as what extant research and
perspectives (critical theories, past studies, my personal experiences) brought to the
sensemaking process. This iterative approach was crucial because I aimed to bring an
etic, existing framework—crip theory—into conversation with what emerged from the
data. As highlighted in my research question, I also came to this project with a defined
interest in the process of medicalization and how it relates to this subject. However, I was
also interested in allowing the data to speak for itself since knowledge about suicide is
45

rarely valued when it comes from those experiencing suicidality themselves. An iterative
approach allowed me to dip in and out of these broader topics while still analyzing what
was present in the data itself.
Narrative and crip analyses. Within this iterative process, one of the primary
sensitizing methods employed to examine these suicide stories was narrative analysis.
Yamasaki, Sharf, and Harter (2014, p. 105) suggest multiple sites of focus toward which
researchers should aim their attention: characters, setting/context, plot/arrangement and
timing of events, storytelling activities and relationships, consequences of narratives, and
purposes/motivations of narratives. In terms of the actual analysis process, those authors
provide a list of guiding questions for each category inspired by narrative theory. In my
analysis, I used these questions (see table below) as sensitizing devices to guide my
initial readings of the data:
TABLE 6.1 Questions Inspired by Narrative Theory (Yamasaki, et al., 2014, p. 105)
Characters
•

How are characters and actions organized in time and space?

•

What archetypal characters live in stories (heroes, antagonists)? Who is
chosen? Who is barred? Who is not eligible or qualified to enact certain roles?

Setting/Context
•

What is the setting(s) of the actions? What is the setting(s) of the storytelling?

•

How do contexts give rise to particular stories?

•

How does storytelling reveal conditions of its production?

•

What sorts of actions or developments does the setting suggest and/or require?

•

What recurrent patterns of human symbolizing are developed and reinforced
by conditions of living?
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•

What narrative conventions are privileged in particular contexts?

•

What stories are (re)told in particular contexts until they become taken for
granted?

Plot/Arrangement and Timing of Events
•

How are the past and future envisioned in light of current circumstances?

•

Why is the succession of events configured in this way?

•

How did the outcome come about?

•

What events and actions contributed to the solution?

•

Are there inconsistencies that suggest alternative narratives?

•

Where are the gaps in stories? Narrative silences? The unmentioned or
unmentionable? Absence of some stories altogether?

Consequences of Narratives
•

What does the story accomplish?

•

What are the consequences produced by particular stories?

•

What social orders are maintained or disrupted through storytelling?

•

What subjectivities/identities are called into being by stories?

•

What new possibilities do stories introduce for being in this world?

•

Under what conditions is storytelling therapeutic?

•

How do stories evolve and change over time as varies constituencies render
their experience in alternative stories?

Storytelling Activities and Relationships
•

What worldviews are reflected in stories?

•

What cultural markers of concern are revealed in narratives?

•

Whose interests are served (or not) by stories?

•

What stories are told to justify actions? Relationships?

•

What motives are assigned to characters through storytelling?
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Since my goal was to understand how attempt survivors narrate their experiences in ways
that reflect and/or deny mainstream understandings of suicide, these questions allowed
me to focus on various ways the narrators expressed their views. The questions and
categories of analysis formed by them helped me find more nuance within the stories by
allowing for simultaneous and contradicting truths. For example, a narrator might frame
biomedical hospitals as settings for horrific abuse, but also frame medications as catalysts
for their healing. This would suggest a more complex view of biomedical care that is not
easily reducible to “good” or “bad” binary conclusions.
Through this narrative approach, I aim to add depth and richness to the primarily
post-positive, empirical nature of the field. Most research in the area emphasizes
predicting and controlling phenomena as opposed to critically analyzing the power
structures behind them (Doucet, Letourneau, & Stoppard, 2010). In terms of suicide, this
often manifests in overarching prevention suggestions that are reactive instead of
proactive. An interpretive or constructivist approach—commonly aligned with narrative
theory—expands these efforts and makes health communication research more open to
participants’ own sensemaking and getting at the “why” behind suicidality before it
becomes a dangerous act. This value is essential to my efforts of valuing suicide attempt
survivor-storytellers’ narratives as valid and important sources of knowledge to better
understanding the phenomenon.
Despite these benefits, such an interpretive approach still does not fully aim the
analysis toward my research question. Crip theory directs that final turn toward critical
sensemaking by allowing me to see pathology within the world as opposed to suicidal
48

individuals. It directs attention to the power of institutions (biomedical hospitals,
universities, workplaces) and ideologies (chemical origins to suicide, belief that suicide is
immoral) instead, ultimately serving as a critical lens through which to read the findings
as they shined through the data. By combining narrative and crip theories, I effectively
“crip” narrative methods (see Sandahl, 2003) by blurring lines of what counts as
[ab]normal in terms of how suicide attempt survivors make sense of their experiences.
This cripped-narrative practice helps address my research question because it disrupts
power that typical defines what is and is not possible, remarkable, and normal in the
world.
Primary-cycle coding: Narrative sensemaking. While embracing narrative
sensemaking (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2001), I began with primary-cycle coding (Tracy,
2013). This open-coding phase identified data relevant to narrative inquiry such as the
presence of characters, settings/contexts, the plot and arrangement of events, and the
consequences of the narratives (see Yamasaki et al., 2014). These first level codes
focused solely on what was present in the data without imposing “how” or “why”
analytical notions. In practice, this meant going through the printed data with various
highlighters, marking narrative elements and their roles in the stories (for example,
marking characters and noting whether they had positive valences [heroes] or negative
valences [villains]). During this, asking myself the questions in Yamasaki et al.’s
“Questions Inspired by Narrative Theory” chart (2014, p. 105) helped me focus on how
each narrative element (e.g., character, setting, plot line) revealed important analytical
moves.
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After going through all of the narratives in this fashion, I then placed all of the
primary data into a digital spreadsheet with the same categorical headings as the
aforementioned chart: characters, setting/context, plot/arrangement and timing of events,
storytelling activities and relationships, consequences of narratives, and
purposes/motivations of narratives (Yamasaki et al., 2014, p. 105). As I recorded the
stories’ elements in this chart, I began creating subcategories for repeated sentiments. For
example, beneath “Purposes/Motivations of Narratives,” I created subcategories for
“Social Causes Upheld” (when narrators talked about social ostracism, homophobia,
sexual abuse, etc. as linking to their suicidality), “Biomed Upheld” (when narrators
embraced medication or hospitalization as key elements in their healing process), and
“Crip Upheld” (when narrators directly cited ableism against people with mental illnesses
as detrimental to their experiences). I continued creating categories beneath each
narrative theory element until all of the data fit in some sort of relevant group.
Having the data arranged in this way allowed me to see themes in narrative
elements, as well as contradictions in the way various narrators viewed certain aspects
common in suicide stories. For example, one of the subcategories beneath “Settings” was
“Role of Hospitalization.” Scrolling down the spreadsheet, which was color-coded by
category as a visual aid, this column allowed me to see significant differences in the ways
various suicide attempt survivors framed this context in their narratives; some found inpatient care life-saving and essential while others framed it is the most horrific part of
their attempt experience. Having the spreadsheet detailed in this way rather than merely
labeled in the printed narratives themselves allowed me to make comparisons directly
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without having to constantly flip through the data and rely on memory to find comparable
narrative elements between the stories.
Secondary-cycle coding: Crip worldmaking. With the data organized in this
spreadsheet format based on narrative theory, I then engaged in secondary-cycle coding
in which I began to organize and synthesize the primary codes into interpretive concepts
(Tracy, 2013). This process moved beyond mere description and instead emphasized
analytic moves into theory and explanation. During this phase of analysis, I also engaged
in prospective conjecture (Tracy, 2013) to employ crip theory and other relevant external
models and assumptions. This practice allowed me to specifically focus on my research
question, which emphasized the role of biomedicine within these stories.
Crip theory was not simply embraced and forced onto the data though; it was used
both positively (affirming and constructing) and negatively (complicating or disrupting).
For example, as I moved through secondary coding I created a broad category entitled
“Crip Approach: Mental Illness as Abject” containing discursive content that framed
suicidal people as society’s abject Others or, as I’ve come to term them, Undesirables.
This included thematic subcategories such as “Institutional” (marking attempt survivors’
exclusion from social organizations) and “Intrapersonal” (marking internal concern about
being viewed as “crazy” by close and distant relational others).
During this time, I also engaged negative case analyses that challenged these
extant models and theories (Tracy, 2013). This runs directly in line with my research
question, which posits two seemingly opposing realities in conversation with one another:
biomedical and sociocritical/crip understandings of suicide. Exemplifying this, I had one
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thematic category labeled “Embrace of Biomedicine” which contained narrative elements
that supported biochemical understandings of mental illness and ran directly against crip
understandings of disability located within society rather than in the individual. This
helped me organize how narrators were including biomedical discourses in their stories in
order to better understand how this model functioned, particularly as it was positioned in
relation to assumed audiences.
Overall, this secondary-coding phase helped me dial data toward the research
question while also ensuring that my own personal biases were not erasing the
perspectives of the narrators. This reflexivity was key because the “mind and body of a
qualitative researcher literally serve as research instruments—absorbing, sifting through,
and interpreting the world through observation, participation, and interviewing” (Tracy,
2013, p. 3). In essence, who I am cannot be removed from what I see during the analysis
process.
Overarching analysis procedures. In review of the above procedures, I began
my analysis process by narrowing the field of data from the entire LTT website to twenty
randomly-selected narratives (236 single-spaced pages). I then used an iterative approach
to engage narrative and crip sensemaking while simultaneously honoring the information
emanating from the stories themselves. Narrative theory provided direction to my
primary-cycle coding, and crip theory did the same for my secondary-cycle coding. I
recorded all parts of my analysis in a digital spreadsheet which allowed me to see the data
in a clear, organized fashion. Once my initial findings were finished, I prepared to share
them with others for corroboration.
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Validity Check
After collecting these narratives and analyzing them on my own, I checked the
validity of my findings using peer data conferencing (Braithwaite, Allen, & Moore, in
press). There is a lack of consensus over verification steps qualitative researchers should
undertake to validate their analyses (Morse et al., 2008; Tracy, 2010), but this method
matched the goals of my study by allowing me to ensure that my own personal biases did
not overshadow the narrators’ stories. The stories had to remain at the core of this
analysis regardless of whether or not the sensemaking present within them aligned with
my own—academically or experientially. As a researcher who also has a personal history
of suicidality, I believe it was important to have others who know me, my story, and my
political biases on the subject present in reviewing my analysis process—a notion which
this validity check method wholeheartedly embraced. Moreover, this validity check
procedure spurred increased self-reflexivity for me as the primary researcher, which
Tracy (2013, p. 2) argues is central to qualitative research. Knowing that my peers would
critique my findings while acknowledging my positionality caused me to preemptively
try to predict their critiques, thus engaging in reflexivity more carefully than I would
have done otherwise.
Shifting to the formal validity check itself, Braithwaite et al. (in press) offer a
clear outline of the steps involved in peer data conferencing. Following their lead, I first
conducted my own analysis and created a rough “methods section draft” as I did so,
recording all of my analysis steps and activities (Tracy, 2013, p. 196). Then I invited a
group of four scholars (including two doctoral candidates, one doctoral student, and my
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thesis advisor) who were willing to engage fully by thoroughly reviewing the codes as
well as challenging my assumptions, analyses, and results. Collectively, these scholars
had expertise in qualitative data analysis, narrative theory and analysis, and/or critical
methods. During the actual data conference (roughly 2 hours in length), I explained the
“trail” of my data analysis process and detailed the justifications for my findings in
relation to my research question. All of us discussed the findings, possibilities for how
they should be organized and revised categorically, and how this analysis would manifest
in written form. We also helped reduce the findings to separate what was relevant to this
particular project, and what could be saved for later projects in order to ensure that the
scope was reasonable and applicable to the study at hand.
Grounding the study with phronetic roots. Reviewing the methods used for this
study, I began with a praxis-based, “phronetic” approach to this research project (Tracy,
2007). I identified a particular problem in the world—misunderstandings of suicide and
the mistreatment of those experiencing it—and systematically collected (in my case,
found), interpreted, and critically analyzed data in order to “open[] a path for possible
social transformation” (Tracy, 2013, p. 4). After narrowing my data field to 20 suicide
attempt survivors’ narratives, I employed an iterative approach to engage narrative and
crip theories while simultaneously honoring what the narrators themselves found
important to share. Narrative theory provided direction to my primary-cycle coding, and
crip theory did the same for my secondary-cycle coding. This process ultimately resulted
in three clear categories narrators used to make sense of suicidality: (1) an embrace of the
biomedical model of suicide as linked to internal pathology; (2) a crip view that
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highlighted mental illness as abject in U.S. society; and (3) critiques of biomedicine that
combined the former two categories and used that link to criticize current norms for
healthcare surrounding suicide.
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Chapter Three — Hybrid Ontologies: Biomedical and Crip Co-Minglings as
Exhibiting Simultaneous Truths
Based on the literature review provided in Chapter One, defining suicide as a
medical malady, social transgression, and/or something else entirely is no easy feat. Over
time the term “suicide” has held multiple meanings depending on its context; religion,
culture, law, science, and historical time periods all affected—and continue to affect—
popular definitions of suicide. Though scientific arguments that self-inflicted death stems
from mental pathology are most commonly accepted in the United States today, such
claims lack scientific origin. There is no known link between mental pathology and
suicidality (Hjelmeland et al., 2012; Szasz, 2011). Between this fact and the biomedical
field’s histories of oppressive diagnostic measures that promote social control over
pathological management, I expected some, if not most, suicide attempt survivors to
critique the biomedical model of mental illness. Like Szasz (2007), who argued that
mental illness was simply a metaphor for human problems in living, I thought that some
of the narrators would position the “mental illness” framework as something used to
control and punish social difference—or to erase other systematic oppressions
(homophobia, racism, classism, etc.) altogether. Due to the dominance of biomedical
discourse, however, I still expected that others would embrace the traditional mental
illness model as truth. My research question, then, was as follows:
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How do attempt survivors narrate their experiences of suicidality in ways that
reflect and/or deny biomedical and sociocritical/crip understandings of suicide?
The “both/and” nature of this question was aimed at embracing complexity in the
narratives as opposed to simply making an argument for one view or another. When
discussing the results of the analysis, this more nuanced view is key because it allows for
multiple truths to coexist without one erasing or overpowering another.
With that complexity in mind, I discuss three key thematic results of this
research—each supported by Yamasaki et al.’s (2014) narrative elements (settings,
characters, plot lines, etc.)—that relate to the research question. First, I examine the
narrators’ use of the biomedical model and its importance to psychological healing as
well as the social tellability of suicide stories. Next, I problematize the salience of this
system by acknowledging hybrid models that blend biomedical understandings with
forms that simultaneously discuss social causes for suicidality. Finally, I outline a crip
framework for understanding mental illness as an abject, Othered social identity in order
to form a broader critical framework for understanding suicidality and the barriers to
receiving help before and after suicide attempts.
Utilizing Biomedical Epistemology
Though the 20 narratives I analyzed were unique in their depictions of suicidality,
almost all of them ultimately embraced a biomedical model that framed suicide as linked
to chemical or neurological errors within the brain. Even if the narrators experienced
significant social and/or physical trauma leading to their attempts (e.g., rape, child abuse,
bullying), they cited mental illness as the end cause of their suicidality. This biomedical
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framing functioned narratively in two main ways: (1) by granting suicide attempt
survivors access to diagnoses, care, and/or medications for American Psychological
Association-sanctioned disorders; and (2) by working as a sensemaking device for
audience members of suicide stories to better understand such a stigmatized concept.
Diagnoses as tools for accessing care. From a biomedical standpoint, many
narrators framed official medical diagnoses as tools to better understand the way their
brains worked. These diagnostic labels were important not only to the tellers’ internal
wellbeing (knowing that they were not alone in their struggles, that such thoughts and
behaviors were not their fault), but also to receiving biomedical treatment such as
medications and hospitalization when they felt they needed it.
One attempt survivor, Erin,5 explained the function of her diagnosis matter-offactly: “…I will always think about killing myself. That’s part of being bipolar” (EO).
She presented this statement as an indisputable fact that explained her past history of
what was previously assumed to be social deviance. Erin’s younger years were packed
with self-harm, getting kicked out of schools, and relational troubles—all of which
contributed to her eventual suicidality, but could not be explained pre-diagnosis. Having
an official diagnostic label is what allowed her to find what she felt was appropriate care:
regular appointments with a “shrink” (counselor) and prescriptions for psychiatric
medication. Using a biomedical framework for her narrative thus allowed her to make

5

All of the names included in this analysis are the actual names of the suicide attempt
survivor-storytellers.
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sense of her personal life history on an internal level, as well as an external one since she
was able to justify her actions and thoughts to others.
Beyond Erin’s story, medications such as anti-depressants and anti-psychotics
were positioned throughout the narratives as crucial aids to the survivors’ continued
mental stability. Finding the correct medication or combination of medications often
presented as a significant challenge since many people react differently—often
horrifically—to psychiatric drugs. Such medications can lead to severe nausea, sexual
dysfunction, sleep problems, increased anxiety, and increased suicidality and attempts
(National Institute of Mental Health, 2016). For some, these imagined and/or experienced
harmful effects cut off efforts to seek medication altogether. However, survivors that
sought and were able to find the correct medication often positioned this moment a key
turning point through which they were able to heal and get back to their everyday lives.
Narratively, this meant that biomedical care was framed in a positive light. Furthermore,
biomedical ontologies of suicide as an issue of chemical error in the brain was understood
as something treatable through medication, even though finding proper medications could
be difficult.
Despite this potential for medication-based recuperation, psychiatric drugs hold a
harsh stigma in the United States’ dominant cultural sphere. Shayda, an attempt survivor
and longtime medication user exemplified how use of the biomedical model can eclipse
such a stigma:
It’s not like, “You’re doing well now, you don’t need your medication.” It’s
actually like, “I’m doing well now because I have my medication.” You wouldn’t
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tell someone who has diabetes, “You know what? You’re doing great, right? You
can stop taking your insulin.” We just wouldn’t have that conversation with
someone. (SK) (emphasis mine)
By putting psychiatric medications in conversation with those used to treat diabetes,
Shayda challenged outside others who positioned her medication as unimportant. She
earlier expressed undergoing significant pressure to stop taking these medications now
that she is no longer suicidal, which, as she argued, would never happen in the case of a
physical illness. In her case, the biomedical model functions positively as a metaphor to
absolve suicide attempt survivors of some of the stigma that comes with receiving long
term medical care. Biomedical discourse allows her story to make sense in the minds of
those who may not understand, which makes receiving care (medications) for her mind
much easier.
“Who am I to kill myself?”: Biomedicine as a cure for narrative untellability.
In addition to helping suicide attempt survivors find what they believed to be proper
healthcare, calling on the dominant worldview of suicidality as inherently attached
mental illness—something biochemical or neurological in origin—helped those without a
history of trauma to convey their experiences of suicide to broader audiences. Many of
the LTT narrators assumed that people would only accept, and thus understand, their
suicide stories if the conditions leading up to the attempt were significantly horrific (e.g.,
hostage situations, repeated sexual abuse, starvation, etc.). By contrast, if the narrators
lived relatively trauma-free, “normal” lives, their suicide narratives would not be
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accepted; they would be unfairly judged or deemed utterly incoherent because they did
not align with audience expectations.
For these narrators without seemingly “sufficient” traumatic pasts, a biomedical
diagnosis of mental illness serves as a bridge across what would otherwise be an instance
of narrative untellability: a gap in which the rising action (lack of trauma) of the stories
wouldn’t seem to lead to the climax (suicide attempt). Shuman (2005) explains this
phenomenon of untellability, noting that some stories are tellable “only if the teller is
willing to live with existing categories for interpreting experience” (p. 7), in this case, if
they could categorize their pre-attempt life as appropriately horrific, or if they were living
with a mental illness that clouded their perceptions of reality.
The issue of pre-diagnosis untellability was expressed directly by many narrators.
“Who am I to ask for help?” Matt explained, describing his past thinking patterns as
shrouded in guilt. “Nothing bad happened to me. I grew up in a nice house with nice
friends and family, so who the hell am I to kill myself?” (MF). This notion of lacking a
justifiable cause for suicidality induced high levels of shame for this attempt survivor,
and it was not until a physician designated his darkened mental state as biological in
origin that he came to terms with his own thoughts. The biomedical model therefore
helped Matt bridge the logical gap in his story by explaining his seemingly irrational
thoughts as easily attributable to chemical imbalance. This understanding led to a sense
of recovery in which suicide is “no longer an option” for him.
Internal dialogues concerning the ability to justify the desire to die were not
simply personal issues, however; these fears of narrative untellability were often based in
61

past lived conversations with relational others. Lyndee revealed this issue in discussing
her mental health prior to being suicidal:
A lot of people would say things like, “What do you have to be depressed about?”
Which is silly because depression doesn’t need a reason; it just is. For the most
part, my life wasn’t totally screwed up. I didn’t come from a bad background. I
just didn’t have the reasons that people wanted. It just was. (LM)
As Lyndee explained, she lacked “the reasons that people wanted” (traumatic
experiences) for being suicidal. This untellability isolated her because others simply
could not understand why she felt the way she did. Beyond troubling the storytelling
process, this untellability directly manifested in both Matt and Lyndee’s narratives as a
deterrent for seeking social or medical help. The inability to form a socially “suitable”
backstory around their suicidality directly prevented people from accessing care
throughout the LTT narratives.
While a matter of faulty narration may seem minor, the impacts of untellability in
a human society of storytellers (homonarrans) are extensive (Shuman, 2005). Narrative
tellability functions here not simply in a social manner, but also as a crucial part of
accessing life-saving care; it opens the doors for people to receive medications,
hospitalizations, and other medical treatments. This access to care directly stemmed from
narrators utilizing the biomedical model of mental illness. This biomedical framework
allowed their narratives to make sense in a world that does not often find compassion or
understanding in listening to accounts of self-inflicted death (or attempts thereof).
Furthermore, the biomedical model also removes blame from the narrator, a key issue
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since many people who die by or attempt suicide are deemed selfish and/or immoral
(Reynolds, 2016).
Hybrid modeling: Social links to biological changes. While nearly all of the
narrators used the biomedical master narrative of mental illness as the cause of suicidality
to substantiate their stories, the vast majority blended these claims with others more
social in origin. They created hybrid ontologies for their suicidal inclinations by arguing
that mental health is both biological and affected by social circumstance. This finding
substantiates the fields of epigenetics and trauma biology in their assertions that social
horrors can, in fact, alter human biochemistry. With or without scientific backing,
however, it is well-documented that the social contexts of suicide are extraordinarily
relevant to people’s decisions to attempt. As Reynolds (2016) explains, defining a
person’s suicide as solely internal in nature blurs the contexts of their struggles which, by
extension, “obscures violence” committed against those who eventually die at their own
hand (p. 175).
Within the LTT narratives, the importance of social contexts for suicide was
expressed through metaphor. For example, when discussing whether or not he believed in
the concept of mental illness following a lengthy conversation about his suicidality being
linked to his perceived failings as a Mormon man to support his family financially, Dave
explained, “I think, to a degree, all of us have [mental illnesses]. We always talk about
baggage of life—that we all have baggage—and to a certain extent, I believe that mental
illness is baggage that we carry with us: how we were raised, moments in our life” (DJ).
Though this narrator also directly claimed that he believed in biological mental illness
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and has seen it “up front,” he also suggested that the origin of such illnesses might not be
purely chemical. This aligned with many other narratives whose tellers included histories
of physical and emotional abuse, sexual assault, homophobic bullying, racism, and
chronic physical illness.
Following the pattern of suicide stories including histories of abuse and suffering,
another narrator more fully parses out this issue of trauma: “Well, mental illness, for
many people, usually comes after a lot of trauma…So, it’s curious that we spend millions
of dollars on looking at genetic causes when, instead, we could be looking at reaching
trauma” (AU). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2014) corroborates
this assertion. Though they explain that trauma biology is still a developing area of
research, it is already established that “exposure to trauma leads to a cascade of
biological changes and stress responses” such as changes in the limbic system
functioning, neurotransmitter-related dysregulation, and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
axis activity changes (USDHHS, 2014, p. 65). This means that traumatic experiences can
and do, in fact, change human biology. Furthermore, they do so in ways that impact
mental health in particular (e.g., Southwick et al., 1999).
Issues typically associated with horrific experiences like post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) are well-known to have psychosocial implications (avoiding certain
spaces or situations, lashing out against loved ones). However, internal biological
changes are rarely brought to conversation outside medical circles. Related to this issue,
Oral (1998) remarks on the ‘great origin myth’ in suicidology: the implicit notion that
“the ultimate origin of suicide, whatever the stressful precursors, lies within the person”
64

(p. 229). The trauma biology and epigenetics perspectives dismantle this assertion of the
myth of internal causation as partial fable, and further highlight that social and biological
perspectives on suicidality may not be so distant from one another. In fact, social issues
may cause biological changes (neurological illnesses) that precipitate suicidal thoughts
and actions. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, more research on this matter
could bridge many conflicting theories on the ontology of suicide. Instead of looking for
an “ultimate cause” of suicide in this pursuit, I argue that researchers must hold space for
multiple, likely simultaneous, truths.
Another suicide attempt survivor, Vyronika, explained through metaphor her
worldview on the matter of social and biological comorbidities:
When one person in the community is sick, it’s because the community itself is
sick. [The sick person is] the canary. In the early mining days, they would take a
canary down into the mineshaft and if the canary didn’t sing, it’s because there
were gasses down there that were toxic and the canary had died…I think that
people with illness of any sort are a canary for our community…Time and time
again, it’s proven itself true. People with mental illness were lacking on some sort
of resource in their community, some sort of ability to meet their needs, because I
think that that patterning in the brain happens as a coping mechanism. Their brain
does something to make something happen. (VVM)
This metaphor presents a sophisticated scientific idea in a more accessible form by
alluding to historical practices. In doing so, this counter narrative also frames people with
mental illness as societal victims—not as aggressors as they are often framed in news
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reports (shooters) (Metzl & MacLeish, 2015) and mainstream movies (psychological
killers) (e.g., Michael Myers in Halloween, 1978; Buffalo Bill in Silence of the Lambs,
1991; Norman Bates in Psycho, 1960). Overall, this shift in framing alters the focus
toward a more critical view of people with mental illness as “crazies” who are directly
oppressed by their place as Others in the United States’ mainstream sociocultural sphere.
The [em]power[ment] of biomedical frames. Though all of the narratives I
analyzed in this study depicted suicide in different lights, almost all of them utilized the
biomedical model that frames suicide as linked to biochemical errors within the brain.
“Mental illness” was repeatedly cited as the ultimate cause for the tellers’ suicidality,
even if they experienced significant trauma leading to their attempts. Using this
biomedical framing functioned narratively in two main ways: first, by granting suicide
attempt survivors access to diagnoses, care, and/or medications; and second, by working
as a sensemaking device for audience members of suicide stories to better understand
such a stigmatized concept. Regardless of whether such a framework was included
intentionally to meet these goals or simply what came naturally to the narrators,
biomedical framings directly benefited suicide attempt survivors in their attempts to tell
the stories of their experiences.
Cripping Mental Illness: “Crazies” as Society’s Ultimate Other
While the biomedical model was often used to aid attempt survivors in easing
their own guilt for being suicidal seemingly without a justifiable traumatic cause, such
pathological framings also had negative effects in the form of discrimination. Because the
psychiatric view locates blame and illness within the individual—not the society—people
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are often Othered as incurable deviants. Suicidal people within this lens become society’s
“Undesirables”: people who cannot function “normally” and must be carefully
monitored, controlled, and isolated from the rest of society. Suicidality in this sense is
often framed as a contagion (i.e., the Werther Effect in which one person’s suicide makes
others more susceptible to copycat suicides) at best, and a danger (i.e.., those who attack
others before killing themselves) at worst. In all cases, suicidal people are framed as a
selfish danger to society as opposed to people in need of help and compassion (see
Batterham, Calear, & Christensen, 2013). This issue of stigma manifested in the
narratives through three main channels: (1) media representations of monstrous
“psychos”; (2) internalized intrapersonal messages about what it means to be “crazy”;
and (3) institutional discrimination such as religious excommunication or employment
termination.
Ignorance promoted by media representations of ‘psychos’. Echoing the crip
perspective, stigma evolving from media representations of the monstrously ill Other was
a central part of the setting of nearly all of the LTT narratives. In the United States’ most
popular horror films, fictional characters with alleged mental illnesses are often portrayed
as mass murderers, monsters, or similarly horrific beings unable to grasp normative,
civilized life (e.g., Michael Myers in Halloween, 1978; Buffalo Bill in Silence of the
Lambs, 1991; Norman Bates in Psycho, 1960). Mainstream news broadcasts often
similarly attribute mental illnesses to criminals like school shooters without knowledge of
any sort of biomedical diagnostic information for these aggressors (Metzl & MacLeish,
2015). This means that the “mental illness” label has effectively become a marker of
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social abnormality as opposed to a confirmed pathological disorder, making media
representations all the more important to analyze.
The permeation of media is significant in the realm of mental illness because for
many people, media representations are not matched with somatically-gained knowledge
(Ott & Mack, 2009). In other words, many people come to know mental illness and
suicidality solely through media channels and representation—not interpersonal, direct
interactions with those experiencing these issues. The narrators of LTT were well-aware
of this phenomenon, and cited it numerous times as a barrier to receiving help. “Every
single college shooting, all of this other stuff, you’ve got this anti-mental illness thing
going on,” explained Erin. “At CNN, they do active shooter drills and people are afraid of
people with mental illness. There’s no understanding of what mental illness is…We have
such an ignorance” (EO). Erin’s assertion directly promotes a crip understanding of
mental illness in which the issue lies not within the individual, but within the culture
surrounding them. In this narrative, dealing with mental illness is framed as a manageable
project in biomedical means (medication, therapy, etc.). However, reaching access to
such care is hugely difficult in a world full of stigma and anti-“psycho” sentiments.
Further explaining this crip perspective on mental illness, Sarah, another attempt
survivor with experience in mental health activism, emphasized this problem:
People have this view of what it means to have a mental health issue…what it
means to be suicidal, and they then discriminate and they’re prejudiced against
that. And it’s fear based, right? I get that. Most prejudice is, and it just permeates.
It permeates everything about our culture. (SC)
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Sarah’s explanation affirms social science academic research on stigma. It is well
documented that labeling someone as mentally ill is positively correlated with the belief
of that person as dangerous (e.g., Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2003). This perception of
danger directly leads to a desire for “greater social distance” from the person beneath the
“mentally ill” label (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2003, p. 308), a phenomenon that was
frequently cited as a social concern amongst suicide attempt survivors’ narrations. Matt,
another of these survivors, similar explained these fears of social ostracism: “I was afraid
that someone was going to think I was fucking crazy…I was afraid of what people would
think of what was going on inside of my head, that I was some kind of psycho,
Columbine, some type of mass murderer, which I’m not” (MF). For him, identifying as
mentally ill directly characterized him as “some type of mass murderer” in the eyes of
those around him. This directly formed a barrier to him seeking any form of social or
medical care—even in the most desperate of times. In his narrative and many others’,
media representations of people with mental illness as “psychos” were assumed to leak
into the psyches of interpersonal others around him.
Internalized manifestations of stigma. Media representations of the monstrous
mentally ill patient caused significant intra- and inter-personal struggles for suicide
attempt survivors who were afraid that being diagnosed or deemed “ill” would mean that
they were also “crazy.” This conundrum surfaced throughout the narratives, particularly
when the storytellers described themselves as characters. Melanie explained the trouble
of seeking counseling, even when she knew she wanted and needed it: “I was ashamed of
that, ‘cause going to a therapist—I thought that meant I was crazy…I didn’t want people
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to think that I was crazy or weak or selfish” (MD). Even though this narrator believed
attending therapy would help her wellbeing, her sense of self was harmed by internalized
stigma that labeled her “weak” and “selfish” for seeking help—or even considering it.
Another attempt survivor, Misha, struggled with this issue in university settings.
“Pure stigma was the one thing that really prevented me [from getting the help I needed]”
he explained (MK). The silencing effect of stigma has grave consequences for U.S.
college students in particular, for whom suicide is the leading cause of death (Schwartz,
2006). An estimated 73 percent of college students living with a mental health condition
will experience a mental health crisis while on campus (NAMI, 2012), but 35 percent say
that their school will know nothing about it (NAMI, 2012). Like Misha, many students
shy away from seeking help due to fear of what sort of interpersonal backlash lies in the
future.
In contrast to the harm induced by being called “crazy,” being able to describe
themselves as “normal” was restorative for many narrators and typically served as a
catalyst for an upward narrative arc. This un-labeling, or perhaps more accurately, labelreplacement process gave people freedom to view themselves not as disordered, but as
individuals experiencing a normative variant of human life. One survivor described this
freedom found through reading a book in which the author, who was diagnosed with a
mental illness herself, asserted the normalcy in being bipolar or depressed:
I didn’t realize at that point that other people have suicidal ideations all the time
too, and that it was completely normal. [The author] told me I was normal for
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what I had, and it was the most amazing [feeling]…I can’t even tell you how
awesome that was for me, to be like, ‘You’re normal.’ (EO)
This excerpt reveals the power of counter-narrations which reclaim suicidality from
biomedical views of disorder and abnormality. In doing so, its author reflects a crip
understanding of mental illness that locates impairment within an ableist culture as
opposed to an ill mind. In other words, the author expresses that what disabled her is
societal notions of what it means to be mentally ill (insane, degenerate, etc.)—not her
actual illnesses themselves. When she could redefine herself as “normal,” she was able to
recover much more quickly and is now less bothered when her mind drifts to suicidal
thoughts. Unfortunately, such a simultaneous view of diagnosed mental illness and
“normalcy” existing together is not commonly held. The direct opposite view causes
many issues for suicidal people dealing with institutions such as schools, workplaces, and
religious establishments.
Institutional policies as bases for inducing crip perspectives. Suicide
survivors’ narratives aligned with crip perspectives most closely when they described
being excluded from large social institutions based on stigmatized understandings of
mental illness. In these locations, typically universities, workplaces, and sites of worship,
being framed as sinful liabilities was particularly isolating because these institutions
played central roles in the narrators’ lives. One woman talked about Christian faith
throughout her narrative, and her relationship with God was crucial to her post-attempt
recovery. However, her experience with the church as an institution was not so positive:
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There was a lack of understanding in the church. There were people who thought,
“You just need to have more faith. Your lack of faith is what has led to your
depression”…I've been very involved with my church for a very long time, and so
I just expected more [support]. (LM)
The failing of this narrator’s church to support her in this time of need was particularly
salient to her story because she was raised believing that the church was a place for the
Broken to find support. The fact that such an all-welcoming institution regarded her as
too damaged to help was a huge blow to her psyche. In her narrative, therefore, the
disabling nature of mental illness did not reside in her brain; it was upheld by religious,
institutional views that reflected broader societal stigmas.
This experience of a religious institution as a site of harm is not unique to this
narrators’ story. “Self-murderers” (people why die by suicide) were often—and in some
places continue to be—denied Christian burials (MacDonald & Murphy, 1990, p. 15).
This practice stems from a long-running history of religious framings of suicide as a sin
that challenges the authority of God as sovereign—a transgression that required
punishment that was visible and served as an example to others (Marsh, 2010, p. 88).
Such burial refusal policies were only recently changed in the Church of England, which
until 2015 embraced ecclesiastical laws that prohibited people who died by suicide from
receiving traditional burial rites (Doughty, 2015). Policies forbidding the burial of “selfmurderers” remain in many other Christian factions.
Mirroring religious institutions’ lack of compassion for suicide survivors (or nonsurvivors), educational systems also hold problematic policies therefor. Narrators that
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cited troubles with universities held these schools as central locations for their being, and
were crushed by the potential of being permanently marked as dysfunctional. Misha
explained:
I was terrified that my university was gonna put some big black mark on my
record because I had a suicide attempt, and that I would never get hired where I
wanted to go…I was terrified that if I went and got psychological help, they
would write me off for good…because who the fuck would want a crazy? That is
the most damaging perception because it prevented me from fully seeking help.
(MK)
Though Misha was more concerned about his future career than collegiate inclusion
itself, his reference to the school marking him as Other represents a common—and
justified—concern. Some universities force students receiving mental health care to
withdraw from the school, and many don’t guarantee readmission even after the
treatment is finished (Scelfo, 2015). This means that students who require medical care
can be barred from participation in the academy entirely, even after a known-temporary
crisis is resolved. This exclusion likely damages students twofold: first by increasing
[oftentimes already-high] levels of anxiety and depression, and second by serving as a
deterrent to seeking proper care.
Administrative powers aside, universities are legally required to manage students
with mental illnesses according to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) guidelines.
This legislation explicitly states that “reasonable accommodations” must be made for
students living with “impairments,” including mental illness (American with Disabilities
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Act of 1990, § 12112). Under the ADA, universities may not exclude students because of
their mental health needs unless they fail to meet the university’s scholastic and
behavioral standards even after receiving medical treatment and social assistance.
However, many universities fail to live up to these legal standards. They frequently force
students out of university housing, classes, athletics—sometimes fully ejecting from the
university as a whole despite the clear dangers of this ostracism (Scelfo, 2015). These
institutional policies rarely benefit students struggling with mental illness; they instead
serve university interests regarding liability and the financial implications of providing
special services for students.
Churches’ and universities’ failings to accept and care for suicidal people
commonly extend to other institutions; it is common for workplaces of all kinds to fire or
mistreat employees struggling with mental illnesses (Brohan & Thornicroft, 2010).
Unemployment is alarmingly high for people with mental illnesses as well, sometimes as
much as nine times higher than in the general population (Satorius & Schulze, 2005).
This issue is exemplified by Kelechi, a suicide survivor and mental health consultant,
who described reaching out to her boss about mental and emotional struggles in relation
to her rapist’s continued attempts to contact her, only to be fired due to the stigma of such
an admission: “I told [my boss] my whole story. She sat with me and she listened and she
looked at me empathetically and cared. The next day, I overheard her say to someone,
‘Oh, we gotta get rid of Kelechi. She's crazy’” (KM). As other suicide survivors avoided
telling others about their thoughts for fear social ostracization, this story affirms that such
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hiding actions were justified; the stigma surrounding mental illness holds very real social
and economic consequences.
Implications of crip issues. Nearly all of the survivors who shared their stories
with LTT demonstrated the impact of stigma on their experiences with suicide. Whether
noting this at mainstream media, intrapersonal, or institutional levels, the narrators
consistently noted that suicidal people are framed as society’s undesirable Others—
perhaps even the ultimate Others. Regardless of the narrators’ other oppressed identities
(race, gender, sexuality, class, etc.), being deemed “mentally ill” offered a sort of
supreme, final straw of Otherness. That said, this does not mean that other identities do
not matter when discussing suicidality. An intersectional perspective (Crenshaw, 1989;
1991) highlights a sort of compounding Otherness in which other oppressed identities
combine with mental illness to create an even more nuanced and difficult situation for
those experiencing suicidality. This is not surprising due to the history of the biomedical
oppression of people of color, queer folks, women, and those of low socioeconomic
status, but it is often erased in academic suicidology circles and in broader whitewashed
activism on the subject (Wexler & Gone, 2016; Fullagar & O’Brien, 2016; Reynolds,
2016).
Oftentimes this erasure is justified by claims that pain caused by suicide should
not be ranked as more or less extreme based on social identities. In other words, a white
straight woman and a black trans and pansexual person, when attempting suicide, are in
the same level of pain—the amount required to make them want to die. This notion is, at
its core, true. Oppression cannot be ranked or made numerical “arithmetically” (May,
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2015), nor can human psych-ache be quantified. However, this perspective also erases
key factors in how other oppressive systems such as racism and homophobia form a
matrix of domination (Collins, 2009) with ableist ideologies in ways that directly impact
how people experience social and medical care for suicidality and suicide attempts.
Honoring Simultaneous Truths
The suicide attempt survivor-storytellers included in this study were not unified in
their definitions of the origins of suicidality. Most utilized biomedical ontologies that
linked suicidality to neurological or chemical errors within their brains. This biological
framework allowed them to eclipse issues of narrative untellability, as well as gaining
access to the care (medications, hospitalizations) that they believed they needed. Other
narrators problematized this biomedical perspective with personal histories of trauma
(e.g., rape, abuse, homophobia) as forces contributing to their suicidal leanings, as well as
highlighting the stigma of being called “mentally ill” as a harmful force in their lives.
Despite these ontological conversations and findings, I reiterate that the goal of this study
is not to locate some sort of ultimate Truth about the core of suicide as biological or
social in origin. Rather, it is to honor multiple, simultaneous truths and analyze how they
relate to the way humans care for, interact with, and live as suicidal people.
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Chapter Four — Honoring Experiential Accounts of the Oppressive Manifestations
of “Crazy” Otherness in Biomedical Care
In preparation for this study, I reviewed extensive literature on the history of the
biomedical field. While God (or the men who claimed to represent His6 ideals) was the
main source of social control in the Western world prior to the 19th century, science (and
those who wrote it) became the new arbiter of social control through the Scientific
Revolution. This newfound scientific power brought with it a substantial history of
oppression in which biology was simply used to legitimize existing sociocultural fears
through the process of medicalization. Identity-based oppression against women, trans
people, queer folks, people of color, and others were effectively sanctioned by “science”
and biomedicine.
With this history of oppression in mind, I came to this study expecting narrators
to reject biomedical understandings of mental illness. Following the biomedical field’s
history of medicalizing other oppressed identities, I was highly critical of any claims that
suicide was simply attributable to some sort of illness. By contrast, I aligned with Szasz
in his arguments that mental illness was simply a metaphor for human problems in living,
that the “‘diseased mind’ is a metaphor, a mistake, a myth” (2007, p. xix). In other words,

6

“His” is capitalized in reference to the Christian God, who was and is the primary figure
of holiness in the Western World.
77

mental illness was often used as a disguise to hide contextual issues of social and bodily
trauma (sexual abuse, racism, homophobia, etc.). Particularly because there remains a
lack of empirical findings that solidly link suicidal behaviors to actual physical or mental
pathology (Hjelmeland et al., 2012; Szasz, 2011), I was initially concerned that the LTT
narrators were somehow duped by biomedical institutions and the discourses of science
that underlie them.
Though it initially seemed as if the understandings of biomedicine as an oppressor
were irrelevant to these narrators’ stories of suicidality, the survivors’ accounts of the
biomedical care they received following their attempts revealed a different story. While
still embracing the biomedical mental illness model, the vast majority of the LTT
narratives aligned with Szasz’s critical perspective in another way. Though they did not
agree that mental healthcare was fruitless or that mental illness was a metaphor, the
narrators did echo Szasz’s argument that medicalization, at least in part, functions to
control and punish those labeled “mentally ill” (Szasz, 2007, p. xvi). This was
particularly relevant to the parts of their stories that took place in biomedical hospitals
and psychiatric wards.
This medical, institutional location is key because while most of the LTT
narrators embrace the biomedical model that poses deficits within their brains as the
cause of their disability, they also pointed to oppressive practices and policies in mental
healthcare systems as further disabling forces. This crip understanding highlights that
while the narrators believed that their problems were in some way internal, their
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hardships were compounded by external structures that unnecessarily prevented them
from participating as full members of society.
Though numerous other academics and legal sources have reported issues within
psychiatric treatment centers that align with this perspective (Department of Public
Health, 2014; Campbell & King, 2009) the set of critiques in this chapter comes directly
from the suicide attempt survivors themselves. I use outside sources to further explain
their narratives, but the core of each critique remains rooted deeply in the stories told by
those experiencing issues with biomedical mental healthcare firsthand. On a boarder
level, my efforts to honor what narrators described as relevant epistemologically honors
theories of the flesh: a perspective that privileges the body as a way and site of knowing
(Anzaldúa & Moraga, 1983). This is important because suicide attempt survivors are
rarely allowed to define their own experiences and almost never considered credible
when they articulate their personal histories. My methods therefore offer a power shift
that values individuals living with suicidality as experts of their own experience, which
by extension challenges the authority of their healthcare providers and external others
who oversee biomedical care such as government officials or attorneys.
The LTT narrators’ main critiques of biomedical care are rooted in oppressive
manifestations of Otherness—essentially healthcare providers seeing patients as
“psychos” or monstrous Others. Because the world was not built to handle these
Undesirables, the biomedical system has little pressure or motivation to improve; it
reflects the original bias of people with mental illness as Others and perpetuates it. In this
chapter, I discuss four categories of critiques put forth by LTT suicide survivors in their
79

accounts of [not] receiving medical care.7 First, I outline the difficulties of accessing
mental healthcare as they relate to crip understandings of mental illness as abject. Next, I
work through compounding oppressions and cultural illiteracy as they impact people’s
experiences—particularly as they relate to race—while receiving out-patient care.
Finally, I talk about the manifestations of crip othering within in-patient institutions and
how stigma directly impacts human bodies and lives as they exist in such facilities or, as
they are often claimed in metaphor, “prisons for the mentally ill.”
Crip Implications for Accessing Care
For people experiencing suicidality, the manifestations of stigma impact their
medical care even before they receive it. As outlined in Chapter Three, media-based,
intrapersonal, and institutional oppressions based in stigma intertwine to co-form suicide
attempt survivors as abject Others in the broader sociocultural sphere. Beyond initially
coming to understand the social implications of being viewed as Undesirables, suicide
attempt survivors cited two main barriers to receiving care: (1) cost of treatment; and (2)
not being taken seriously enough to receive care despite requests therefor. Both of these
reflected crip understandings of suicidality within the narrators, meaning that these
survivor-storytellers viewed the disability of being suicidal as rooted in the external
world as opposed to their internal minds/selves. It was the biomedical care they received

7

I separated these critiques from the analysis section because I viewed them as the
narrators’ discussions of why understanding how suicide gets defined is important.
Beyond analyzing how suicide is explained ontologically, these critiques of biomedicine
discuss care-based manifestations of power dynamics between biomedical and other less
pervasive perspectives on the subject.
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that was disabling—not their suicidal minds which could, by contrast, be treated and
potentially cured were it not for these barriers.
Treatment cost. Because the United States currently runs a system of privatized
healthcare in which individuals pay for all of their own care and insurance, obtaining
desired biomedical or otherwise therapeutic services for mental illnesses (including
suicidality, whether or not it is linked to neurological pathology) is hugely cost
prohibitive and restrictive. Narrators framed cost as a direct barrier to the progress of
their healing because they could not afford access to such care, even with private
insurance because these policies rarely covered mental healthcare. One of the attempt
survivors, Erin, exemplified this issue of classism as a barrier to care:
There are some amazing programs out there, but they’re for people who have
money. I cannot tell you how many times I have wished and prayed to God that
somebody would send me to Sierra Tucson8 so I could take time to focus and get
back to me, but I don’t have $30,000 to spend a month there. I don’t. They’re all
over the place, these nice, private hospitals, and they don’t take insurance, so you
end up in places like here. (EO)
As Erin alluded to “places like here,” she contrasted private residential care centers with
her own: one that she said did not use medical imaging or other tests to better understand
what was happening in her brain, and was staffed with low-paid, uninterested clinicians. I
argue that the overarching lack of affordable and proper healthcare for people with

8

Sierra Tucson is an internationally-renowned residential campus for the treatment of
mental health disorders. Though the website does not include information on cost (it’s
different for all patients), online sources estimate the monthly price at ~$45,000.
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diagnosed mental illnesses—as described by Erin and many other narrators—largely
stems from the fact that such people are viewed as Others: subhuman, non-members of
society who do not deserve the community’s attention or resources. This perspective is
similarly adopted by Vyronika, who noted (in her previously discussed metaphor of a
suicidal person in society as the canary in the mineshaft) that the lack of care is a
systemic, community-wide issue.
With that community-wide context in mind, this care gap as it relates to
socioeconomic status is increasingly discussed in the United States’ political sphere,
particularly with partisan conflicts between the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) and
the recently-failed GOP replacement plan (Collinson et al., 2017). According to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (2017), the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
prevents insurance plans from denying coverage or increasing its cost based on preexisting health conditions, including mental illnesses. However, the ACA is being
challenged by republican majorities across the House of Representatives and the Senate,
as well as the White House. Even if it were to survive the recent conservative push in
Congress, the ACA does not necessarily provide patients with access to private hospitals
like Sierra Tucson as LTT narrator Erin seeks. The wealthy still have access to levels of
care that lower class individuals simply cannot access—insurance/ACA coverage or not.
Narrators in the present study that could afford private residential care (likely
indicating high levels of class privilege) were much less critical of the care they received.
For example, Megan described her experience as much more positive than the majority of
the other LTT narrators:
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I decided I was going to go into a women’s program at a hospital in Rhode
Island…I got to come home that night and sleep in my own bed, which was real
nice, and then I would be there all day learning skills: how to deal with things,
talking to therapists, getting medications fixed, and stuff like that. That was
literally the best thing that has happened to me. (MR)
This narrative’s description of healthcare facilities as positive settings was far from the
majority of the others’ experiences (detailed in later sections of this chapter). The class
divide which seems to split these experiences is not likely to change within the United
States’ capitalist system, so this issue of cost-based barriers to care must be addressed in
future healthcare policies.
“Looking suicidal” versus “performing normality”. Mirroring many other
“invisible illnesses” (Arrol & Dancey, 2014; Selak & Overman, 2012), recognizing a
person as suicidal through external means is difficult. Many crisis intervention centers
offer ways to recognize people at risk for suicide. Such “signs” include as loss of interest
in usual hobbies, sleeping too much or too little, and stressful life events such as job loss
or divorce (American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, 2017). However, the vast
majority of people exhibiting these signs and circumstances never consider or attempt
suicide, and many people who do attempt seem “normal” based on outsider evaluations.
This seeming “normal” issue is particularly relevant for suicidal people who do not align
with the stereotypical image of what a person planning a suicide looks like (distraught,
distanced, etc.). Many LTT narrators brought up this issue in their own experiences of
seeking care.
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When characterizing themselves within their narratives, many suicide attempt
survivors noted that their social functionality (relative to the assumption that suicidal
people cannot engage in typical life tasks) meant that they were not taken seriously by
biomedical care providers. If the narrators did not properly perform “mentally ill” or
“suicidal”—meaning they were visibly distraught or “psychotic”—when seeking help,
clinicians often assumed they were faking it or otherwise deemed these people unworthy
of attention. Sarah explained her experience with this: “I went to a school counselor and
asked for help, and they told me that I didn’t really need help: ‘You don’t have problems.
You get really good grades and you have friends. Everything’s okay’” (SC). Being
denied care based on performance is particularly problematic for teens and young adults.
The group’s increased investment in social relationships frequently manifests itself in
excessive concern about the possibility of being disliked by others, and as a result,
individuals within it often place high value on performing in ways designed to please
those around them (Robins & Block, 1988). This means that they are likely to perform
“normality” (in Sarah’s case, “get really good grades”) and hide any sorts of behavior
that may identify them as “crazy” or otherwise abnormal, even during times of significant
psyche-ache or emotional trauma.
Such hiding also has protective effects in a world that harms people with mental
illnesses. As stated previously, people with mental illnesses (diagnosed or assumed) are
2.5 times more likely to be attacked, raped, or mugged than the general population
(Hiday, 1999), and are frequently subject to institutional discrimination (Brohan &
Thornicroft, 2010; Scelfo, 2015). This means that people experiencing suicidality are
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likely to hide their thoughts and outward signals thereof. Despite this propensity to fake
“being okay,” biomedical care providers continue to reject patients who do not seem
adequately distressed and therefore believably suicidal.
Kelechi, another narrator who struggled to receive care based on outward
evaluations of her abilities, expressed outright mocking of her requests for medical care:
At the hospital, they laughed at me. They were like, “You’re so high functioning!
You’re fine!”…I was like, you know, “I want to die.” Doesn’t mean that I can’t
tell you that I want to die, just because I use good words…Because I can
eloquently tell you I want to die, you’re like, “Oh you’re healthy. You’re fine.”
(KM)
Though it is clear that many people who are suicidal can still function in school,
workplaces, and the like, the dominant cultural image of “psychos” hides this reality from
outside eyes—including healthcare providers. This issue may initially seem practical, as
though the providers are simply trying to determine who needs and does not need care so
they can be most efficient. However, the clinicians’ laughter included in Kelechi’s story
suggests that efficiency is not the sole result of such practices; impact and intent are not
necessarily aligned. Efforts to visibly determine who is “truly” suicidal can function to
further marginalize those who seek care, reflecting broader oppressive views of
biomedical clinicians as the sole arbiters of defining who is sick and what sort of care
they need.
Barriers to care: A crip perspective. As expressed above, the manifestations of
stigma impact suicidal people’s medical care at a base level by acting as gatekeepers.
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Attempt survivors cited two main barriers to receiving care for suicidality: (1) cost and
lack of insurance coverage; and (2) not being taken seriously enough to receive care
despite requests therefor. I argue that these issues reflect crip understandings of
suicidality within the narrators. Mirroring the tenants of crip theory, these survivorstorytellers viewed the disability of being suicidal as rooted in the external world
(insurance companies, privatized healthcare, biomedical care providers) as opposed to
their internal minds/selves. It was the biomedical care they received that was disabling—
not their suicidal brains.
Compounding Oppression and Cultural Illiteracy
When looking at suicide narratives, it is essential to note that the tellers are not
simply “suicidal” people. They hold a myriad of other social identities such as race,
gender, class, sexual orientation, age, nationality, and ability. Taking an intersectional
approach (that embraces these various social identities) to analyzing the failings of
biomedical care allows for deeper and more nuanced analysis that favors critical views
over generalizable ones (May, 2015). This perspective illuminated two main critiques of
biomedical care in the LTT narratives: (1) a lack of social identity awareness during care;
and (2) failure to address social issues and oppression beyond mental health. These two
themes are closely interrelated, but the former refers to how patient care is conducted,
while the latter focuses on the causes of suicidality in the first place.
Lacking social identity awareness during care. Survivor-storytellers often cast
those providing medical care as villain characters who contributed to their trauma instead
of easing it. Most often, this was due to the fact that these clinicians—knowingly or
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not—contributed to systems of oppression already at play because they did not recognize
the importance of the sociocultural identities held by their patients. In other words, they
perpetuated racist, homophobic, or otherwise oppressive ideologies through their words
and actions. Angela, a black woman who dealt with suicidality from a young age,
explained the impact of racism on the care she was given:
I was put on Seroquel.9 About 800mg, which is absolutely horrible, since the
standard dose is 300. African Americans, unfortunately, are usually dosed much
more highly than whites. I fell over in the streets and the doctor decided to lower
it to 600mg…[Physicians] saw African Americans as being more aggressive and
more dangerous, even if the symptoms presented by a white person were the
same, and they tended to dose [African Americans] higher. (AU)
Angela’s claims are not without backing. Clinicians in emergency rooms prescribe more
and higher doses of antipsychotic medications to African Americans than to whites
(Segel et al, 1996), as do other physicians and nurses working in in-patient wards
(Chung, Mahler, & Kakuma, 1995). Though some argue that this is because black
people’s metabolisms biologically require more medications for the drugs to be effective,
the opposite is presented in biomedical research. A greater amount of African Americans
than whites are said to metabolize various psychiatric medications more slowly, and they
are more sensitive to them overall (Ziegler & Biggs, 1977; Bradford et al., 1998). This
means they should be dosed at lower levels, not higher ones.

9

Seroquel is a brand-name form of quetiapine, an antipsychotic medication used for the
treatment of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder.
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While race-based science is clouded in histories of oppression (Robinson, 1983),
the fact that these studies are regarded by the Surgeon General’s Report on Mental
Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity (2001) as Truth means that they should be taken
seriously by the medical community. The fact that African Americans receive larger
doses of medications despite this is hugely problematic, and reflects stereotypical views
of the black body as a site of danger (see Orbe et al., 2000). This racist oppression
combines with views of the mentally ill as menacing to society in order to form a sort of
compounding oppression for people of color experiencing suicidality.
This assemblage of identity-based oppression is also found in people who have a
history of other mental illnesses. Cleo, a combat veteran with severe PTSD, highlighted
this when she described her experience of calling a suicide hotline. Instead of sending
help, a police officer called her and asked if she had any weapons in the house. When she
said she had a gun that was unloaded and locked in a case, the officer asked her to step
outside. She continued:
I open my door and I step outside and there's a SWAT team out there. I mean, I'm
talking the van, the SWAT van, eight patrol cars and they got shotguns and M-16s
and pistols pointed at me and they're screaming, “Get down, get down, get down,
get down!”…And like four officers, you know, one on my neck, one my hip,
they're cuffing me and I’m like, “What the fuck is going on?” (CDL)
Cleo explained that the local police knew her history of military service and did not want
to take any risks regarding her potential for violent reactions. While this concern may
seem valid, it does not take into account the narrator’s PTSD—which was also well88

known by the small town police force. Cleo explained that her therapist (notably not part
of a biomedical care team) eloquently described the problematic nature of law
enforcement’s reaction to Cleo’s call while on the phone with the arresting party the next
day: “What the fuck are you guys doing, pulling M-16s and shotguns on a PTSD combat
vet? What’s wrong with you people?” (CDL). By showing up to Cleo’s house with
SWAT forces, the local police force could have actually induced a PTSD episode or
made her suicidality worse (which it seems to have done according to the narrative).
Though the decision to show up with such force was framed by the police as for the
safety of Cleo and the officers, it actually reflects an oppressive view of suicidal people
as inherently “insane” and violent. This, once again, relates to media fascinations with
depicting people with mental illness as murderers and villains far more than it does
reality since people with mental illnesses are far more likely to be targets than
perpetrators of violent corporeal crime (Appleby et al., 2001). It also highlights a lack of
effort to help Cleo in ways that account for her psychiatric disability. This reflects and
ableist view in which suicidal people are deemed burdens to society as opposed to human
beings in need of care.
In both Cleo’s account of local law enforcement (as directed by a suicide hotline)
disregarding her status as a combat veteran with PTSD and Angela’s story of being
overdosed with medication due to assumptions about her race, a lack of social identity
awareness during care for suicidal people led to significant problems. Neither person was
able to receive adequate medical care because their providers did not account for nuances
of their identities. While in both cases providers were aware of the narrators oppressed
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identities (Cleo, PTSD status; Angela, being black), they did not address these identities
in meaningful ways. Beyond serving as a barrier to proper care, this negligence directly
harmed both narrators by furthering the intensity of the race- and ability-based
oppressions they already face.
Failure to address sociocultural systems of power. The lack of sociocultural
identity awareness in caring for suicidal people displayed above also manifested in the
contexts that gave rise to suicidality in the first place. In describing the settings in which
their suicidal thoughts originated, many narrators talked about issues allegedlyunrelated10 to biological mental illness such as sexual abuse, emotional abuse,
homophobia, racism, or failure in school or familial life. These social traumas were rarely
if ever addressed by biomedical care providers, which narrators positioned as huge
barriers to their healing.
One narrator, Kelechi, describes the social situations that gave rise to her
suicidality as just as important to her story as biomedical illnesses:
My mom, because the education system in Georgia is what it is—which is not
great—she had me to go majority white schools, and so I was there. I wasn’t
fitting in. There was a lot of racism happening. I just didn’t understand who I was
supposed to be. I wanted to be close to the other kids in my neighborhood, who
were black, but they didn't really accept me because they thought I wasn’t like
them—because I spoke well, or I read too many books, which actually was a sign

10

Trauma biology and epigenetics perspectives would argue that these experiences likely
are related to physical pathology and/or mental illness.
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of not-blackness. There was a lot of Otherness, so I was just Othered to death. I
frequently thought about how I could leave. I always had a plan B. (KM)
The “in between” space Kelechi describes based on the dissonance between her black
racial identity and “white” performance represents what Turner (1932) defines as a
liminal space. Kelechi’s racially-liminal location reflects Turner’s broader
conceptualizations of liminal spaces as settings in which people’s feelings of entrapment
often cause remarkable distress that sets the “scene of disease, despair, death, [and]
suicide” (1932, p. 46). In this case, it was not necessarily a biological pathology that
required treatment, but rather social changes to promote a more comfortable and livable
space for the narrator that could have helped. Transferring to a different school or
receiving critical support for what it means to exist in a racially-liminal space could have
prevented the teller’s experience of being “Othered to death.” These sorts of solutions are
often addressed by therapists and social workers, but rarely by biomedical physicians in
psychiatric wards where suicide survivors are sent post-attempt.
The same narrator also addressed broader cultural trauma faced by the black
community in the United States, and how this impacts her mental health. “No one should
have to be a hashtag,” she explained, referencing various social media campaigns that
sought to bring attention murders of black people by white police officers. “We’re just
humans, and if we’re not even treated like humans, how do you think that would impact
someone’s mental health? It’s horribly traumatic” (KM). In referencing the very brutal,
corporeal manifestations of white supremacy in police homicides, Kelechi calls into
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question the value placed on her life by dominant society—whether or not she was truly
meant to survive in the first place.
From this narrator’s perspective, oppressive systems—in this case, white
supremacy—that define some lives as more valuable than others can, by extension,
effectively murder those who fall beneath the dominant group. This echoes the notion of
“social murder” put forth in philosophy of Engels, who notes that “when society places
hundreds of proletarians in such a position that they inevitably meet a too early and an
unnatural death…when it places them under conditions in which they cannot live…its
deed is murder just as surely as the deed of the single individual” (1845 [1967, p. 126). In
other words, oppressive forces that make life harder for certain groups of people
essentially slowly kill individuals within these marginalized groups. While those
benefiting from and perpetuating this oppression are not often directly linked to the
deaths of these people, they cannot be absolved of blame.
This social murder philosophical perspective is shared by many critical
suicidologists (e.g., Reynolds, 2016) and LTT suicide attempt survivors. Despite its
prominence, the social murder view is largely if not entirely dismissed by biomedical
mental healthcare providers. The erasure of such oppressions plays into Othering of
suicidal identities themselves, and perpetuates an erasure of personal experience within
patients deemed mentally ill. By failing to address sociocultural systems of power,
caregivers erase many experiences that lead people toward suicidality, as well as
implicate how these patients might best receive care.
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Sociocultural illiteracy as worsening suicidal conditions. As the LTT narrators
illuminate, biomedical care providers rarely address social identities and the power
systems surrounding them when providing care to suicidal patients. This often results in
care that is not well-suited to those receiving it because this care reflects a generalizable
population—in other words, majority identities (white, heterosexual, cisgender, male,
etc.). When patients’ experiences do not align with these privileged experiences, the
treatments they receive oftentimes compound their experiences of psych-ache and
suicidal pain, and effectively worsen their conditions of living.
Manifestations of Crip Othering
After outlining the extreme impacts of social Othering as in the case of social
murder, the direct manifestations of this crip Othering within biomedical care for suicidal
patients can be explored more critically. To review, a crip understanding of suicidality
states that disability does not rest within the individual (as in the case of mental illness
and dominant conceptions of neurology), but rather it is the external world that is
disabling (institutions and relationships that were not built for and do not accommodate
suicidal people). Stigma is a significant part of this crip framework because it represents
both a manifestation of and a mode for perpetuating the Otherness associated with
suicide.
There were three main ways this stigmatized view of the mentally ill Other
(“psycho”) showed up in the LTT narratives. First, attempt survivors cited caregivers’
apparent lack of compassion as shown by poor bedside manner as dehumanizing and
disheartening. Second, for narrators who were trained in mental healthcare fields
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themselves, medical education systems were highlighted as sites of failure that preceded
and promoted the providers’ negative care practices. These initial two themes ultimately
resulted in the third category of patient abuse, which many narrators noted was not
addressed due to the absence of proper accountability measures in the biomedical mental
healthcare field.
Caregivers’ lack of compassion. For the suicide survivor-narrators, the most
obvious symptom of the stigma surrounding suicidality within biomedical hospitals was
the bedside manner exhibited by caregivers. Their nurses’ and physicians’ [anti]social
behavior was hugely important to how the narrators perceived their time spent in
psychiatric hospitalization, and was often one of the first things explained when these
narrators described their hospital stays. Only a few of the narrators—those at private
residential or private university facilities—reported positive bedside manner that
contributed to beneficial care. The rest were highly critical of how their clinicians
interacted with them.
Many of the narrators characterized their healthcare providers as villains because
they seemed to lack compassion for their patients—likely due to their view of suicidal
people as Others. Anita, a survivor and clinician, described this issue when she started
working at the same hospital and intensive care unit where she was treated after her first
suicide attempt:
Some of the nurses I worked with would make comments about some of the
patients that we got in who were suicide attempts. They’d say, “Why don’t we
just let them die?” and stuff like that…They just think that a person who attempts
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suicide is not worth the time to take care of…It was disturbing to see someone
who is supposed to be a medical professional make comments like that. (AE)
Anita attributed this issue of poor bedside manner and “hidden” speak to ignorance.
“Either they don’t really care to know, or they were just not informed about mental health
and mental illness,” she explained (AE). None of these coworkers knew that Anita had
just attempted suicide for the second time, so their comments were unfiltered. Their lack
of compassion was not cited as a cause for Anita’s third attempt, but it is possible that
such a dehumanizing view could have contributed to low self-worth for her preceding it.
Another survivor-narrator, Lyndee, paralleled this experience, showing that poor
bedside manner is a widespread issue. Her parents took her to the emergency room after
she told them that she “took a bunch of pills” one evening in an attempt to die. “The
hospital was pretty rough. People are mean and really lack a lot of understanding,” she
recalled. “That was hard, and that was the general attitude I got from everyone. [The
doctor] kind of snickered at me and shock his head. Most of the nurses were pretty rude.
It was just awful” (LM). Being mistreated and belittled in medical spaces, like in
Lyndee’s narrative, is hugely detrimental since most people dealing with suicidality
already see their lives as unworthy of living. Furthermore, as discussed at the start of this
chapter, accessing biomedical care for mental illness is difficult and traumatic in and of
itself without being exacerbated by poor treatment once entrance is gained.
A crip perspective helps make sense of this lack of compassion on the part of
biomedical clinicians and its relevance to suicidal people. While both Lyndee and Anita
express distaste for the bedside manner the witnessed/received in mental hospitals, a
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critical lens notes that this behavior was not simply an issue of impoliteness. The lack of
attention to compassionate communication reflects broader systems of oppression that
frame people with mental illness as subhuman entities undeserving of respect or
attention. Furthermore, this lack of compassion or attention to bedside manner highlights
the fact that the disability associated with suicidality often lies within the outside world—
stigma and resulting mistreatment of suicidal people—as opposed to being located within
suicidal individuals’ minds.
Lack of education for biomedical practitioners and caregivers. Narrators who
were themselves educated in mental healthcare fields shared similar experiences with
uncompassionate care providers as expressed by those without such insider knowledge.
Those with personal biomedical expertise frequently cited poor bedside manner and
disrespectful interactions with their healthcare providers during hospitalizations.
However, these narrators did not locate the locus of failure in the providers as people;
they argued that it was the education systems that failed to prepare these clinicians for
work with suicidal patients. Sarah explained:
Social work grad school was hell because you see how the people who work in
the mental health system are trained, and you understand differently. It’s not a
personal thing. These people aren’t necessarily bad, but we are trained through
our institutions to systematically dehumanize the Other, and I was the Other. (SC)
In this excerpt, Sarah directly referenced crip notions of abject Otherness in relation to
being mentally ill. She further located the root of this Othering within institutional

96

practice; dehumanized views of people with mental illness as subhuman were taught as
acceptable and encouraged techniques for serving patients better care.
Dehumanizing patients in this manner is a highly controversial but commonplace
practice in the medical field. Many times, subconscious and unintentional
dehumanization of patients occurs as a byproduct of the way human minds evolve to
interact with the functional requirements of performing procedures (oftentimes painful or
gruesome in nature) on multiple patients and functioning in hospital settings (Haque &
Waytz, 2012, p. 178). Many hospital policies, such as not allowing surgeons to operate
on their family members, function to de-individuate the patient in order to give
physicians greater objectivity in their decision-making processes (Anyanwu, Abedi, &
Onohwakpor, 2014). In most cases, such dehumanizing practices are seen as essential to
providing high quality care because they allow physicians to focus on treating illnesses as
opposed to dealing with multifaceted, complex people. It also allows doctors to distance
themselves from patients to avoid being so empathetic that they cannot conduct higher
level medical problem solving (Haque & Waytz, 2012).
These dehumanization patterns are magnified when patients are labeled as their
illnesses. For example, labeling a person as “schizophrenic” rather than “a person with
schizophrenia,” increases objectification because it eclipses the human being altogether
and suggests that the disorder is who they are (Hall, 2002; Sass, 2007). This is
particularly relevant for patients with mental illnesses, who are already framed as
subhuman and incapable of rational thought or human behavior. As revealed in Sarah’s
narrative, this dehumanization can lead clinicians to believe that suicidal patients are
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altogether unworthy of care or attention. The practice does not seem to benefit their care
whatsoever.
Normative efforts to dehumanize patients, however positive in intention, are
amplified for patients of color. Because white supremacist norms are linked to the
assumed heterogeneity of members of nonwhite groups, this allows physicians to further
de-individuate these patients (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Ostrom & Sedikides,
1992). This can have grave effects for people of color who attempt suicide or present as
patients assumed mental illnesses, such as the overdosing of African American patients
discussed in earlier in this chapter. As one of the LTT narrators who is now in nursing
school attests, “Psych, as far as education, is only—in my program—a seven and a half
week course” (AE). If nurses are given less than two months to learn about all types of
mental illnesses, is it unlikely that they are also educated about the nuances of
dehumanization and its impacts on varying identity groups during this time. Such
reflexivity and social awareness takes far longer to develop than any one course, and
further presents a lifelong commitment for those who seek such critical reflection in their
thoughts and actions.
Though a few of the narrators in this study attempted to determine whether
biomedical mental healthcare providers lacked compassion for their patients due to
personal, educational, or structural issues, it is fair to assume that all three of these factors
are relevant to this issue of dehumanization. Such stigmatized beliefs, ideologies, and
policies cannot be neatly separated from one another and therefore must be addressed as
an assemblage. Though conducting a thorough analysis of this assemblage is beyond the
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sphere of this paper, what is important to recognize is the knowledge shared by LTT
narrators repeatedly: that internal Othering manifests in very real harm for suicide
attempt survivors—particularly during inpatient care.
Hospitalization as imprisonment. Beyond understanding mental hospitalization
as a site for dehumanization based on uncompassionate and apathetic communication
from care providers, many LTT narrators regarded psychiatric wards as prisons. These
institutions were framed as sites of mistreatment, isolation, and punishment—not
recovery or health. Because of this hospital-as-jail characterization, being committed to
an inpatient mental hospital was a site of constant fear for many narrators. Many of these
storysharers saw hospitalization as a form of imprisonment that would, much like jailing,
result in poor treatment and increased stigma around their minds. Even if they were able
to endure their time physically restrained to the hospital, their reputations as “crazies”
who were locked up like criminals would carry on long after their release.
Leanne’s view of hospitalization as imprisonment directly prevented her from
seeking medical care. After attempting suicide by slitting her arm, her initial thought was
to seek medical treatment. “’Perhaps I should get stitches,’” she began in an internal
dialogue. “But [I stopped] in instant defense mode, because you don’t want to get put into
a mental institution where they basically lock you up and it’s like a jail, essentially”
(LK). Another narrator echoed this sentiment in her own time of desperation: “I was so
tired and scared and I just didn’t want to be sent to a facility. It’s a scary thing when
you’re [hospitalized] and you don't have a say in it anymore” (LM). Both of these attempt
survivors framed hospital settings as barriers to—not sites for—receiving help. Such
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fears are not without base; it is common practice for suicide attempt survivors to be
forcibly hospitalized after their actions regardless of their own desires for treatment.
In the state of California, for example, a person who is deemed suicidal by a
medical professional can be “involuntarily contained” and locked in a psychiatric unit for
three days (Bonn, 2010). After this initial period, the hospital can extend this hold for an
additional 14 days, barring a hearing in which the patient is able to convince a judge
without any sort of medical training that such an extension is unnecessary. Though these
hearings are available, biomedical expertise is seldom challenged and the 14-day hold is
rarely overturned (Los Angeles Superior Court, n.d.). This highlights the core issue of
biomedical dominance within suicide: the fact that its power often reigns unquestioned.
For the LTT narrators, unquestioned/forced hospitalization was not solely a
representation of decreased freedom; it also reflected an American history of defining
suicide as a literal criminal act. Thomas Szasz, 50 years after he rocked the psychiatric
world with “The Myth of Psychotherapy,” came back to reassert his initial claims:
My offense—if it be so deemed—was calling public attention to the linguistic
pretensions of psychiatry and its pre-emptive rhetoric. Who can be against
‘helping suffering patients’ or ‘providing patients with life-saving treatment’?
Rejecting that jargon, I insisted that mental hospitals are like prisons not hospitals,
that involuntary mental hospitalisation is a type of imprisonment not medical care,
and that coercive psychiatrists function as judges and jailers not physicians and
healers. (Szasz, 2011, p. 180)
These bold claims confront the biomedical model head-on, but not without base. Many
practices common within inpatient psychiatric wards mirror those in prisons:
straightjacketing, placing patients/prisoners in isolation rooms, forcing them to take
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medications, confining them in locked chambers, and restricting and monitoring their
contact with the outside world.
Kelechi, describes little detail of her time in inpatient care. Instead, she simply
stated that the hospital was “very scary.” She explained the impact of her time there
succinctly: “What I learned from being in the hospital was now to never be in a hospital
again, which wasn’t a good thing to learn, because the main thing I learned was to never
tell anyone the truth” (KM). Though she did not describe what she experienced while
hospitalized, she did point out that her admission was not consensual, and her time their
directly prohibited her from seeking medical care in the future. For her, being locked up
was a punishment—not a treatment.
Famed sociologist Erving Goffman (1961) reflected Kelechi’s framing when he
categorized mental hospitals in the same group as prisons, concentration camps, and
orphanages. Each of these, he argued, are “total institutions,” meaning that they are
places of residence where a large amount of similarly-situated people are kept together
and cut off from the wider community. These closed institutions are highly structured
and, in the case of mental asylums, socialize people into the role of a good patient:
someone “‘dull, harmless and inconspicuous,’ which in turn reinforce[s] notions of
chronicity in severe mental illness” (Lester & Gask, 2006; citing Goffman, 1961). This
“good patient” does not reject their treatment within the psychiatric hospital; they accept
it without question. This is not necessarily the case in reality. Patients frequently resist
treatment during inpatient care. Unfortunately, this resistance has little impact on the
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greater structures of oppression within mental hospitals—most notably, the abuse that
occurs within their walls.
Overall, the notion of hospitalization as imprisonment represents a significant
manifestation of “crazy” Otherness in biomedical care. From a crip perspective, the
unquestioned power of mental institutions is problematic because external sources of
oppression—as opposed to internal pathologies—are what disable people experiencing
suicidality. In the attempt survivors’ stories, being hospitalized reflected their roles as
societal Others in need of containment. Forced hospitalization also quite literally disabled
the narrators by removing their agency. Once institutionalized, people with [assumed]
mental illnesses are unable to make decisions for themselves about when and what to eat,
when to sleep, what to wear, and even what sorts of medications they will consume. This
alters their abilities far beyond the restrictions formed by being suicidal in the first place.
Abuse and the absence of accountability. The core of involuntary containment
(forced hospitalization) policies rests in the biomedical model’s assumption that
physicians as the true “knowers” of experiences related to illness; patient experiences and
utterances are untrustworthy. The issue with the overarching reach of biomedical power
does not solely reside in the fact that it forces people into medical care; the issue lies
within the lack of checks and balances therefor. Leaving mental health clinicians with the
ultimate power to define a person’s treatment and experience sets the stage for abuse
within psychiatric wards because they tend to be less transparent, and therefore, less
accountable to mistreatments therein.
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Because of the dominant worldview of people with mental illness as insane and
unreliable, patients’ accounts of such abusive events are easily refuted. This makes peerreviewed research on the subject difficult to conduct, and leaves many accounts of abuse
to the margins of rumors, cultural myths, and unauthorized online documentaries. This
study emphasizes shifting the power to “know” these experiences from external
researchers to those with lived histories of such abuses. The survivor-narrators who told
their stories to LTT disclosed several abuses to which they were subjected while in
psychiatric wards, and it is likely that others hid these experiences for fear of backlash or
further stigmatization.
Sarah explained that while she was in the hospital, she fell off a chair and broke
her foot while hanging posters with positive quotes on the walls. The doctors refused to
give her pain medication (ibuprofen) or x-ray the bones. “They had essentially
pathologized my broken foot as a mental illness…So in my medical records, what it
looked like was that I was unstable and totally crazy and just wanted attention, and yet
my foot was broken” (SC). The physicians eventually x-rayed her ankle, “so then they
had all this ammo to say that [she] was lying.” Sarah explained that the break was in her
foot, not her ankle, and it took three days for doctors to honor her need for further
imaging tests—which confirmed the broken foot—and resulting treatment. In this case,
she was forced to suffer the untreated pain of a broken foot as well as to live without any
sort of care (such as splinting or casting) therefor simply because her outcries were
attributed to psychosis. Viewing her as an insane Other essentially enabled biomedical
clinicians to dismiss her claims of orthopedic fracture as simply a failure to connect with
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reality. This assumption led to abuse that, arguably, would not occur beyond the walls of
locked psychiatric wards.
Other accounts of abuse stemmed from what is perhaps the most controversial
treatment available for patients with mental illness in contemporary times:
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Previously known as electro-shock therapy and
conducted on homosexuals11 while they viewed same-sex erotic images, this treatment
was initially used as “aversion for sexual deviations” (see Feldman, 1966). The treatment
is presently “established” and deemed “highly effective” for patients experiencing
suicidality (Prudic & Sackeim, 1999), and involves the passing of electric currents
through the brain to trigger brief seizures. According to the Mayo Clinic (2017), ECT
seems to cause changes in brain chemistry that can “quickly reverse symptoms of certain
mental illnesses.” The positivity of such reports, however, are not shared by the survivornarrators in this study.
One narrator explained that despite claims of needing further help after being
discharged from the hospital, her doctors would only let her back to their care facility if
she agreed to undergo ECT:
We call that coercion, and from what I know now, obviously, it happens all the
time in the mental health system, but I didn’t know that then. I agreed to do the
first one, and it was horrible, and it was as traumatic and violating as one would
expect it to be when they knock you out and they shock your brain and you wake

11

I use term “homosexuals” intentionally over “gay” or “queer” people because it reflects
the pathological orientation of the term, which originated as a biomedical diagnosis for
same-sex attraction.
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up in complete and total pain and confusion. And then they deny that…They told
me I was such a ‘quick cure’ because, after the first one, I was so terrified of it
that I knew I had to do whatever I could to get out of the system. (SC)
While proper procedure for ECT involves anesthesia, most descriptions of the therapy
fail to mention post-procedural pain. In addition, facilities vary considerably in many
aspects of ECT practice, oftentimes evidently departing from the standards for safety and
comfort set by the field (Prudic, Olfson, & Sackeim, 2001). Many ECT practitioners also
fail to recognize the impacts of its problematic history of use in conversion therapies and
how this might impact the mental and emotional wellbeing of LGBTQ patients, among
others whose predecessors were abused by such “treatments” for non-pathological
identities.
Like Sarah, Cleo’s description of ECT was similarly dismal. “So they shocked my
brain three times a week for six months,” she explained. “I’ve had 180 shock treatments
to my brain and all it really succeeded in doing is shredding my memory. It didn’t work.
It made me more paranoid” (CDL). Long-term risks for ECT, which increase in
likelihood and severity with concurrent cardiovascular and other medical illnesses,
include spontaneous seizures, memory loss (retrograde amnesia), severe and persistent
cognitive deficits, and death (Weiner, 1994; Mayo Clinic, 2017). While many other
medical procedures have similar risks, what divides ECT for suicidal patients from other
circumstances is consent. Adults with physical health conditions must consent to
treatment for their bodies. By contrast, adults with mental health conditions can be
quickly deemed unfit to make such decisions, and thus can be thrust into treatment
105

without their own approval (see U.S. Supreme Court cases Youngberg v. Romeo, 102
S.Ct. 2452, U.S.Pa., 1982; Mills v. Rogers, 102 S.Ct. 2442 U.S., 1982; Rennie v. Klein,
102 S.Ct. 3506 U.S., 1982). In these cases, the risks of procedures such as ECT may not
be adequately understood by patients—if shared with them at all. This lack of consent
further dehumanizes suicide attempt survivors and people with mental illnesses by
marking them incapable of making decisions, particularly those like ECT that have the
potential to cause severe disabilities and alterations to their lives.
Oppression, Otherness, and What Being “Crip” Means in Biomedical Practice
In summary, while most of the LTT narrators utilized the biomedical mental
illness model as a framework for their stories, the vast majority of these suicide attempt
survivors also aligned with a critical perspective of biomedical care. Most argued, at least
in part, that biomedicine functions to control and punish those labeled “mentally ill”
(Szasz, 2007, p. xvi). This was particularly relevant to the parts of their stories that took
place in biomedical hospitals. This institutional location was key because the narrators
pointed to oppressive practices and policies within these psychiatric hospitals as disabling
forces that worsened their quality of life. This crip understanding of external forces (as
opposed to internal pathologies) as the core of disability highlights that while the
narrators believed that their problems were in some way internal, these hardships were
compounded by external structures that unnecessarily prevented them from participating
as full members of society.
In this chapter, I discussed four categories of critiques put forth by LTT suicide
survivors in their accounts of failing to receive proper medical care. First, I reviewed crip
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implications for accessing mental healthcare based on cost prohibitions and issues of
“looking suicidal” versus “performing normality.” These discussions were followed by
analyses of instances of compounding oppressions in which social identities (race,
gender, veteran status, etc.) and sociocultural systems of power (racism, ableism,
homophobia, etc.) were ignored to due cultural illiteracy and a lack of reflexivity on
behalf of the biomedical care providers. All of this ultimately led to three main
manifestations of crip Othering: lack of compassion from caregivers and lack of
education therefor, hospitalization as imprisonment, and abuse within psychiatric wards.
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Chapter Five — Conclusions and [Un]Final Thoughts
Estimations suggest that one person in the United States attempts suicide every 38
seconds (Yeager & Roberts, 2015, p. 38). Though only about four percent of these
attempts are completed, over 44,000 Americans die by suicide each year (AFSP, 2016).
Despite this being the 10th leading cause of death in the nation, communication about
suicide remains uncommon. Stigma surrounding the matter promotes a culture of silence
in which individuals’ stories of suicidal experiences are rarely shared, making it difficult
for researchers to understand what it means to live with the desire to die.
In spite of the difficulty surrounding data collection on the subject of suicide,
researchers in numerous fields such as sociology, psychology, biomedicine, cultural
studies, and religious studies have long sought to find and define the ontology of selfinflicted death. In recent times, the “position that suicide rises as a consequence of mental
illness is often presented as an indisputable scientific and medical fact” (Marsh, 2010, p.
27). However, a concrete biomedical understanding of what underlies suicidal behaviors
remains elusive. The American Psychiatric Association’s “Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM) recently shifted suicide from a symptom of other
psychiatric disorders to a condition in and of itself (APA, 2013, p. 801). This relocation is
tentative however, and suicide now resides in section on “conditions for further study.”
By admitting this provisional nature, the APA shows a crucial glitch in medical
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understandings of suicidal behavior and marks it as an issue that evades current medical
knowledge. In essence, what most people “knew” about suicide as it relates to mental
health is now up for debate in medical communities.
In this study, I used the fracture in contemporary biomedical understandings of
suicide as a call to action. The medical field’s admission that suicide may not truly be a
pathological/internal issue related to mental illness opened space for alternative ways of
knowing to gain significant ground, which I saw as an opportunity for more critical
perspectives on suicidality to be centralized. I used a narrative approach to studying the
topic because I wanted to see what people experiencing suicidality directly had to say
about their condition. Analyzing first-person narratives allowed me to do this while also
shifting definitional power from biomedical researchers to their patients. In essence, I
embraced theories of the flesh: an approach to knowledge that privileges the body as a
way and site of knowing (Anzaldúa & Moraga, 1983). This runs directly against
dominant frameworks of what knowledge “counts” as Truth and who gets to define this
information as such.
To add a critical lens to traditional narrative theory and method, I introduced crip
theory—for the first time in health communication studies of suicidality—as an
overarching framework. Crip theory (McRuer, 2006) approaches the study of disability in
opposition to medical models that locate impairment and pathology within the individual.
According to this lens, what actually impairs a person is living in a culture and a world
that does not account for their needs. “Essentially,” Krieg explains, “the person is not
disabled, but rather it is the world that is disabling” (2013, p. 44 [emphasis in original]).
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While this may seem entirely contradictory to biomedical models of suicide as the
product of internal pathology (mental illness), I sought to research how this crip
perspective might add to contemporary understandings of suicidality, and furthermore
how it might positively impact healthcare practices.
Though crip theory’s emphasis on the sociocritical seems to strike a polar
relationship with biomedical understandings of disability, I argued that the two can also
be used to inform, challenge, and improve one another. With that potential in mind I
began my study with the following research question:
How do attempt survivors narrate their experiences of suicidality in ways that
reflect and/or deny biomedical and sociocritical/crip understandings of suicide?
In my analysis, I found that the vast majority of suicide attempt survivor-storytellers
utilized biomedical models of mental illness as the cause of suicidality. They claimed that
official diagnoses and oftentimes the treatments and medications that followed were
essential to their healing processes post-attempt.
At the same time, these narrators also problematized the biomedical model by
noting the stigma that comes with being labeled “mentally ill.” This notion of “crazies”
(people with mental illnesses) as society’s ultimate Other directly harmed attempt
survivors and left them ostracized from their peers, subjects of institutional
discrimination, and more distant from potential treatments for their low states of
wellbeing. In essence, the disability associated with being suicidal or mentally ill was
located in the external world (ableist ideologies, institutions, and policies) as opposed to
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the minds of individuals experiencing suicidality. This understanding mirrors crip theory
perspectives and holds significant implications for biomedical care.
The discussion based on my analysis was centered around honoring experiential
accounts that describe the oppressive manifestations of “crazy” Otherness within
biomedical care. The narrators noted that people with mental illnesses and those
experiencing suicidality are subhuman in the eyes of many healthcare providers. This
meant that their care was subpar and in many cases abusive. In discussing the experiences
shared by the narrators, I discussed various issues with biomedical healthcare practices.
Treatments within this field are costly (and thus unattainable by many), often denied to
people who do not appear “properly” suicidal (openly distraught or “crazy”). Clinicians
also lack social identity awareness and cultural literacy, making it more difficult for
patients experiencing interlocking systems of oppression such as ableism, racism, and
gender-based violence simultaneously to receive proper care that accounts for these
circumstances. All of this Othering eventually manifests in caregivers’ lack of
compassion for patients post-suicide attempt. The resulting dehumanization of suicidal
people results in many of them viewing hospitals as prisons and sites for rampant abuse
based on the lack of accountability therefor.
To summarize this research, I will discuss the strengths of my project based on
the three goals I set at the beginning of the work. I will then consider the limitations of
this study and suggestions for future research before fleshing out the implications of this
work for future academic studies in health communication and critical suicidology, as
well as for healthcare policy. Finally, I will end with future directions for my own work.
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Strengths: Revisiting the Three Goals of the Study
Related to the academic and activist implications of this study, the goals of this
project were threefold: (1) to bring together, critique, and problematize numerous fields’
exiting conceptualizations of suicide; (2) to fortify the academic study of health
communication by expanding its [post]positivist history into critical qualitative directions
using crip theory as a lens; and (3) to embrace experiential ways of knowing in the form
of suicide attempt survivors’ narratives as valid and important to acknowledge and study,
not only as data but also as voices of expertise. All three of these goals were met
throughout the project.
Interdisciplinary and interparadigmatic approaches. In both the literature
review and the methods, I purposefully brought together numerous fields’
conceptualizations of suicide. This was important because suicidology spans many large
disciplines such as psychology, biology, sociology, religious studies, and philosophy.
Focusing on any one in particular would have unnecessarily excluded important ways of
understanding suicide, and furthermore would not have provided a broad enough
platform on which to rest the suicide attempt survivors’ narratives as data that speak for
themselves. Having a broad, interdisciplinary approach opened doors for multiple ways
of meaning-making to emanate from the data.
From a paradigmatic perspective, numerous scholars have cited the importance of
moving beyond traditional silos of research paradigms in organizational communication
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(Deetz, 2001), family communication (Droser, 2017), and health communication
(Lupton, 1994). This study extends these efforts and serves as an example of such a
destabilizing move in terms of the history of clearly delineated paradigmatic approaches
within suicidology and health communication. In addition to shedding light on the
benefits of interdisciplinary scholarship, this interparadigmatic approach highlights the
power of conducting research as relevant to the data, research question, and problem
being addressed as opposed to appealing to normative structures and frames of what
research “should” look like according to academic traditions.
Contributing methodologically and theoretically to the field of health
communication. In line with transgressing disciplinary and paradigmatic lines, through
this study I also sought to fortify the academic field of health communication by
expanding its [post]positivist history into critical qualitative directions. Narrative inquiry
was already a well-established part of this field, but this study was the first to combine
narrative sensemaking with crip theory (“cripping” narrative methods). It was also the
first to address suicidality from a narrative perspective. Overall, this crip-narrative
sensemaking combination expanded narrative inquiry topically as well as
methodologically.
One of this study’s main strengths was its innovative method, or perhaps more
accurately, theory-method assemblage. Most narrative inquiry is interpretive in nature
and does not engage with critical theories; it emphasizes letting people’s stories speak for
themselves. Narrative theory can certainly be critical in nature if the researcher
employing it chooses, but deliberately adding a critical theory to narrative social science
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methods is a unique turn. This bringing-together of critical and interpretive paradigms is
important from the other direction as well; crip theory is typically applied to rhetorical
methods (e.g., McRuer, 2006), not social scientific ones like narrative sensemaking. With
these separations in mind, bringing narrative and crip theorizing together in an iterative
approach marked a significant move for health communication studies that opens doors
for further methodological and theoretical blendings in the future.
Reclaiming voice for suicidal people. In terms of critical suicidology, this study
also answers the call of Webb (2010) who argues that the greatest failing of
contemporary research on suicide is the failure to include and embrace the lived
experiences of those considering self-inflicted deaths. With an iterative analytical
approach, this study offers an example of the power of intertwining attempt survivors’
narratives with extant research in ways that better direct academic studies by allowing
attempt survivors themselves to direct researchers to areas most relevant to their
experiences. This approach embraced experiential ways of knowing in the form of
suicide attempt survivors’ narratives as valid and important to acknowledge and study,
not only as data but also as voices of expertise that deserve and require proper
recognition.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Despite the various strengths of this study, the work also holds significant
limitations. First of all, it emphasized United States contexts and did not account for other
locational settings that embrace biomedical approaches to healthcare. In addition, the fact
that data were collected through LTT posed limitations on whose stories could be
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included in this study. Furthermore, the relevance of the salience of biomedical
frameworks within the narrators’ stories is debatable.
Emphasis on the United States. All of the narratives analyzed for this study
were collected within the United States. This is relevant because all of the narratives
shared were situated within a specific form of Western biomedical care that is not
universal. This is locational aspect important because, for example, different countries
have highly variant policies on forced hospitalization even when they share biomedical
models for mental illness as the core of suicidality. Varying nations also have different
systems of paying for healthcare such as socialized medicine in which individuals are less
likely to encounter cost-based barriers to their care. Future studies should address this by
extending work on the power of biomedical discourse within suicidality to other locations
around the world. This context-based limitation is compounded by the limiting standards
present in the data collection method.
Data collection: Whose stories can be shared on LTT? All of the narratives
used in this study were shared publically on the Live Through This website. The stories
were accompanied by photographic portraits and the full names of their tellers. This
restricts the data to people who were willing and able to tell their stories without fear of
family, friends, or employers finding out. This likely means that the tellers were “out”
about their suicide attempts and at least somewhat well-rehearsed and comfortable in
sharing their experiences with others prior to telling having their stories transcribed
through LTT. People whose suicide attempts were comparatively kept secret due to
personal, relational, or institutional limitations could not be collected in the dataset. This
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limitation likely precludes attempt survivors in political positions, those presently
working in biomedical fields, and others for whom public storysharing could prove
detrimental to their employment or familial lives.
The LTT requirements for participation set by the site’s founder also reduced the
field of who was able to share their stories. All narrators had to be over the age of 18,
which limited access to pediatric suicidal patients—those who likely would have endured
increased oppression and dehumanization based on ageist assumptions about their
sensemaking abilities. In addition to being legal adults, participants also had to be one
year out from their most recent suicide attempt, so the stories were largely retrospective.
This time restraint takes away from the power of hearing from those currently going
through biomedical hospitalization post-attempt. Rawer accounts may have different
perspectives on what causes and cures (or at least treats) suicidality.
Problematizing the salience of biomedical modeling. As a final limitation, I
seek to problematize the presence of biomedical frameworks within the narrators’ stories.
While it is clear that the narrators’ reliance upon biomedical modeling had many benefits
in terms of helping suicidal people and those around them come to terms with suicidality,
its ubiquity in these narratives must be questioned. Because the “suicide as a product of
mental illness” notion is dominant in the United States’ sociocultural sphere, the fact that
the narrators included it as their worldview does not necessarily define it as their Truth. It
may alternatively be a model that the narrators internalized due to hegemonic forces and,
thus, narrative tellability as opposed to something their own lived experience birthed into
understanding. In other words, they may have attributed their suicidality to neurological
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or chemical issues in their brains not because they believed this was true, but because it
would help others hear their stories more readily.
Of course, this is speculation; I cannot know the narrators’ intentions behind
setting their narrative worldviews as such—particularly because I was not the one
interviewing the study’s narrators. It is certainly possible that chemical/neuro-biological
issues lead to suicidality in some people, even though it has not yet been scientifically
proven that such a link exists (Hjelmeland et al., 2012; Szasz, 2011). My concern in
addressing this limitation is not to argue whether or not the narrators were “correct” about
the roots of their suicidality; rather, it is to highlight that their responses, like the
biomedical care they received, could not be free of external/sociocultural systems of
meaning.
Implications
Despite the limitations addressed above, this study holds significant implications
for the field of suicidology as well as for healthcare policy. Both are important to my
aims as a scholar conducting “phronetic” research that is rooted in praxis-based change
(Tracy, 2007). Before forming this study, I identified a specific problem in the world—
misunderstandings of suicide and the mistreatment of those experiencing it—and
systematically conducted a study in order to “open[] a path for possible social
transformation” (Tracy, 2013, p. 4). Social transformation at the forefront, my findings
are relevant to the academic study of critical suicidology as well as to healthcare policy
activism far beyond the walls of the Ivory Tower.
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Implications for the study of critical suicidology. Though attention to stigma is
ubiquitous throughout critical conversations surrounding suicide (see examples in White
et al., 2016), crip theory more specifically has not yet been applied to this concept. The
theory is only a decade old at this time, but it follows longstanding cultural studies
traditions that question the naturalized order of things by considering how phenomena are
embedded in complex economic, social, institutional, ideological, and cultural relations.
These roots make crip theory a natural fit for critical suicidology, and my hope is that this
study serves as a jumping-off point for myself and others to use the lens in more inclusive
ways because this work implies that such a pursuit is both possible and beneficial to
critical projects.
Despite this positive potential for furthering critical thought, crip theory (much
like its queer theoretical parent) is often critiqued as a whitewashed entity that focuses on
a single axis of identity ([dis]ability for crip theory, sexuality for queer theory) and erases
the others (race, gender, age, nationality, etc.) by extension. With this study I highlighted
that such erasure is not inherent to crip theory; the power to embrace or reject
intersectionality lies within the researcher employing it. By directly engaging with issues
of race amongst other social identities in addition to “mentally ill” and “suicidal” labels, I
suggest that future research within the realm of critical suicidology will similarly
embrace these intersectional inclusions as central to their analysis—not some sort of
sidebar or footnote.
Suggestions for healthcare policy. In addition to the academic implications of
this study, the project also calls for significant work in healthcare policy and activism
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therefor. Because the study’s narrators revealed numerous experiences of abuse while
patients within mental health institutions—notably when they were forced into these
hospitals—it is essential that policy changes increase transparency of such facilities.
Making these facilities less closed and opaque would increase accountability for
biomedical clinicians while also allowing for more checks and balances to be set in place.
As some of the study’s narrators who were themselves trained in biomedical
practices noted, much of the mistreatment in mental health facilities is related to the lack
of education for practitioners. Adding mandatory education policies surrounding
compassionate communication, the role of stigma in Othering people with mental
illnesses, sociocultural elements of suicidality, as well as biomedical histories of identitybased oppression would better prepare clinicians to care for suicidal people. This
mandatory education should also include aspects of self-reflexivity that encourage care
providers to be critical of their own biases, privileges, and experiences as they relate to
their work.
Embracing non-Western approaches to medicine and healthcare. This study
also calls into question the overarching power of biomedicine within the United States.
Other cultures’ medical practices—commonly known as “Eastern” medicine and
encompassing practices like homeopathy, acupuncture, Ayurveda, osteopathic medicine,
massage, and yoga—have long recognized the connection between sociocultural
experiences and health. Recent biomedical pursuits such as those present in trauma
biology research are slow to join this claim, and are only just beginning to do so as they
gain “empirical” support for this argument. The fact that the narrators in this study made
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it clear that their health and suicidality were directly linked to social experiences suggests
that others struggling in this arena might find better support in “nontraditional” medical
practices that are more understanding of this mind-body link.
Future Directions
Personally, this study served as one of many in what I hope will be a critical line
of work on suicide and health communication. In the future, I hope to expand narrative
work on the subject, specifically as it was suggested as a form of treatment by narrators
in this study. I also aim to approach the topic from critical participatory action research,
media studies, and arts-based methods.
Narrative redirection as treatment. Many of the narrators reflected Frank’s
(2013) notion of the “narrative wreck” in their stories. They positioned significant
illnesses—in this case suicide attempts—as roadblocks that crushed the narratives they
imagined their lives would follow. The ensuing narrative chaos caused significant distress
in which attempt survivors could not imagine life following their suicidal actions.
Creating new narratives is what allowed people to move forward. Craig explained:
I had to take note of where I stood before I felt like I could move on. I looked
really deeply at the things that I was hanging onto, the molestation and the
bullying and broken home and all the other shit that went along with it. I had to
make sense of it for me…I had to find hope, not only in my future, but I had to
find that hope in my past. (CM)
For this narrator, narratively making sense of his experience was the key to creating a
new future. A handful of other attempt survivors echoed this circumstance of the
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narrative wreck as one of significant distress, but also an issue that, when resolved, could
have massive implications for increased wellbeing.
In the future, I would like to work with psychologists and social workers to
explore the possibility of introducing a sort of “narrative therapy” (similar to White and
Epston’s [1990] method) into care facilities for suicide attempt survivors. As Jones
asserts, storytelling is a “survival strategy for people who have been historically
marginalized” (2015, p. 773). The implication of reclaiming this storytelling/meaningmaking process within settings that cause marginalization in the first place could hold
critical potential for conscientization and activism in the arena. I would also be interested
in pursuing this sort of narrative therapy through community/arts-based means since it is
traditionally employed in solo, talk-therapy settings. Based on my own history of
working with narrative/art sensemaking and activism on the subject of baby loss through
The Scraps of the Heart Project (2015), I believe community and arts-based research
holds significant promise within suicidology.
Expanding methods of study. Regardless of method, I hope future studies will
continue this project’s efforts toward honoring firsthand accounts of suicidality as
valuable crucial sites of knowing. Studies using critical participatory action research
(CPAR) (Cahill, 2007) to directly involve attempt survivors in the entire formation and
conduction of a project would offer significant promise in this arena. This CPAR
methodology could be matched with the above discussed narrative/art-based sensemaking
to directly involve people experiencing suicidality in research and activism for ethical
treatment of themselves and others in similar situations. Furthermore, participatory
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methods would allow attempt survivors to not only engage in these efforts, but to lead
them in conjunction with other researchers.
In addition to these nontraditional forms of academic research, I also intend to
extend my work on crip theory and suicide within the more established discipline of
media studies. Though this would not necessarily honor survivor narratives to the degree
that this thesis project did, I believe media studies on suicide are a worthwhile pursuit due
to the audience this work reaches. Critical media projects are often more accessed by
broader audiences—including undergraduate students—than critical health
communication studies, so the former holds significant potential for social change.
Conclusion: Reflexive Engagement
As mentioned briefly in Chapter Two, I did not come to this study solely as an
outsider or casually interested researcher; I have a longstanding personal history of
suicidality. I was just 10 years old when the thought of suicide first entered my mind. I
made my first plan to attempt at age 18, but never actually began the process, nor have I
ever engaged in any sort of physical self-harm. Today, almost five years after that initial
(and final) plan, I consider myself an activist for increased compassion surrounding
issues of suicide and those affected by it.
Because of my personal history and activist orientation, reflexivity was a central
part of conducting this study. Engaging in critical self-reflection is essential to all health
communication research regardless of method, but it is particularly relevant for critical
narrative work. This is because just as storytellers make sense of their experiences in the
telling, audiences (or researchers) also make sense of stories as they hear them. Who we
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are as listeners cannot be removed from what we hear in other people’s stories.
Therefore, though it is not the norm for social science research, in future work with
cripped or otherwise critical narrative methods, I will emphasize my reflexivity process
within the writing itself. Reflexivity should be centralized during these projects, not left
to the margins of private conversations or personal journals.
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•
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•
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•
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•
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•
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•
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•
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•
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•
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•
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•
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